The unconstitutionality of the Constitution La inconstitucionalidad de la Constitución L’inconstitutionnalité de la Constitution A inconstitucionalidade da Constituição Die verfassungswidrigkeit der Verfassung


It was common for nineteenth-century abolitionists to disparage the United States Constitution. William Lloyd Garrison called it “a covenant with death” and “an agreement with hell,” due to the dominant (and enforced) pro-slavery reading of the document (Garrison qtd. in Long, pg. 13). This was not the view, however, of Boston abolitionist Lysander Spooner. Spooner argued at considerable length in his controversial 1845 work, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery, that despite the intentions of the framers, and despite the fact that most reasonable people understood the Constitution to authorize slavery, the only defensible reading of the text was one that banned the practice. Spooner reached these conclusions by deploying his own method of legal interpretation that heavily incorporated other beliefs he held about natural law. Those pre-interpretive natural law views would later take center stage in 1870, with his explicitly anarchist No Treason. There, Spooner argues that monopoly government1 is inherently illegitimate, or more specifically, illegal.

Intuitively, both Spooner’s abolitionist interpretation of the Constitution and his later claim that monopoly governments are illegal seem absurd. Yet I will argue here that Spooner’s views on law as prior and superior to legislation, as well as his methods of interpreting legislation through natural law, are highly plausible and necessary for pursuing justice. I will begin by outlining what those legal naturalist views and methods of interpretation are, while showing how each complements the other. Then I will address a few potential objections, and in the process, relate Spooner’s views to more contemporary approaches to legal interpretation. Then, I will address, through a Spoonerite lens, his later-in-life target, the monopoly government the Constitution is thought to authorize. I will first affirm Spooner’s own contention that, given the naturalistic status of law, the monopoly government set up by the Constitution as almost universally understood, is illegal. While that will flow in a fairly straightforward way from the previous parts of the paper, I will go on to make a stronger claim that requires more explaining. I will claim, using Lysander Spooner’s own interpretive theory, that the Constitution as almost universally understood – one that would authorize the formation and maintenance of a monopoly government – is not only illegal, but unconstitutional. To do so, I will begin by listing the several places in which the Constitution appears to explicitly authorize a crucial and distinguishing feature of monopoly government. After that, I will outline the several places that explicitly refer to normative terms that not only authorize but require a moralized, natural law reading of the Constitution, and I will argue that these aspects of the Constitution are primary. This will be further supported by reference to sections of the Constitution that not only refer to justice in the abstract, but point us in the direction of its more specified content. It will then be time to revisit those sections that appear to explicitly authorize the naturally illegal aspects of monopoly government, put them in a new light with those other sections in mind, and give alternative, naturally legal readings. In conclusion, I will show how the previous conclusions of this paper point a conceptual incoherence in non-libertarian legal systems.

Spooner and natural law

For the length of this paper, I will be assuming a roughly libertarian account of justice.2 By “libertarian,” I refer to a broad set of views holding that individuals have “self-ownership,” or exclusive right to determine their own non-invasive actions. Corollaries to this include principles like “equality of liberty,” in which no person is allowed to have a liberty not shared by other persons, and “non-aggression,” in which no person is allowed to initiate either force or fraud when dealing with another person, except in self-defense or when seeking restitution. The approach here will remain within a fairly large ball park of more specific conceptions.

With that in mind, we can proceed to Spooner’s view of natural law, and how it stands distinct from legislation. Spooner refers to natural law as “the science of mine and thine – the science of justice,” by which he means “the science of peace[,] … which can alone tell us on what conditions mankind can live in peace, or ought to live in peace, with each other” (Spooner “Natural Law,” pg. 53). In differentiating between “moral” duties and “legal” duties, Spooner tells that

“Man, no doubt, owes many other moral duties to his fellow men; such as to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, shelter the homeless, care for the sick, protect the defenseless, assist the weak, and enlighten the ignorant. But these are simply moral duties, of which each an must be his own judge, in each particular case, as to whether, and how, and how far, he can, or will, perform them. But of his legal duty – that is, of his duty to live honestly towards his fellow men – his fellow men not only may judge, but for their own protection, must judge. And, if need be, they may rightfully compel him to perform it. They may do this, acting singly, or in concert.” (Spooner “Natural Law,” pg. 55-56)

In other words, “law,” for Spooner, refers specifically to those moral claims that are actionable. For something to not only be an immoral harm by one person against another person but also a crime, it must be something that one can legitimately use force to either prevent, end, or demand compensation for. Seeing as Spooner accepts a libertarian theory of justice and rights, this means instances of aggression – force or fraud initiated for any reason other than defense against or restitution from a preceding instance of aggression. Spooner’s use of the broad phrase “honesty” might leave the reader unconvinced that this is his meaning. Elsewhere in the same piece, though, he explicitly refers to “force or fraud, committed by one man against the person or property of another” (61), and states that the “immutable and universal law” is made up of the “principles [of an individual’s] … natural rights of person and property” (61). In his work “Vices Are Not Crimes,”3 he defines “crimes” as “those acts by which one man harms the person or property of another,” in contrast to “vices” which are simply “those acts by which a man harms himself or his property” (Spooner “Vices Are,” pt. I).

This is all well and good, but even if we accept Spooner’s libertarianism, why are we to join him in accepting his definition of “crimes” as essentially “rights violations?” Legislation (at least as almost universally understood), those who draft it, and those who enforce it, certainly seem to consider quite a few things beyond just moral vices to be crimes. Surely, Spooner is not claiming that we already live in his libertarian utopia. Of course, this is not his claim. The actual claim he makes here rests on a fundamental separation between “law” and “legislation.” In his later years, when the emphasis on the natural-law-as-prior-to- legislation aspect of his views was more pronounced than the aspect that used natural-law-as-a-lens-for- interpretation, he put that distinction in very blunt terms:

“What, then, is legislation? It is an assumption by one man, or body of men, of absolute, irresponsible dominion over all other men whom they can suspect their power. It is the assumption by one man, or body of men, of a right to suspect all other men to their will and their service. It is the assumption by one man, or body of men, of a right to abolish outright all the natural rights, all the natural liberty of all other men; to make all other men their slaves; to arbitrarily dictate to all other men what they may, and may not, do; what they may, and may not, have; what they may, and may not, be. It is, in short, the assumption of a right to banish the principle of human rights, the principle of justice itself, from off the earth, and set up their own personal will, pleasure, and interest in its place. All this, and nothing less, is involved in the very idea that there can be any such thing as legislation that is obligatory upon those upon whom it is imposed.” (Spooner “Natural Law,” 67).4

Why not just say that legislation out of step with natural law is just bad law? At first glance, we might think Spooner is just playing word games to rationalize radical provocations. There’s a point to those radical provocations, however, and that point is that we carry with us our pre-existing moral obligations even when we engage with each other through the legal system. Unless we assume that law magically relieves us of those previous moral obligations, it must only authorize activity that its participants already had the authority to authorize. As Roderick Long, a contemporary political philosopher who takes influence from Spooner, explains:

“Suppose, for example, that the U.S. Congress were to pass legislation outlawing Buddhism. Would this legislation have the force of law in the United States? Arguably no, it would not, even if it were rigorously enforced – because the Constitution, the ‘supreme law of the land,’ forbids any abridgment of the ‘free exercise of religion.’ Since it is from the Constitution that Congress derives its legislative powers, any statutes it passes in contravention of the Constitution exceed its powers and so have no more claim to law than some opinion I might scribble on a lavatory wall. But where does the Constitution get its legal authority? From the state conventions that ratified it? What authorized those state conventions to ratify it? Unless the regress terminates in something possessing inherent authority, something natural rather than conventional, it’s hard to see how anything along the line counts as having authority (and so as having the status of law)” (Long “Inside and Outside,” 15-16).

As Spooner succinctly contends, “[g]overnment may have no powers except as individuals may rightfully delegate to it” (Spooner qtd. in Barnett “Was Slavery Constitutional,” pt. II). A positivist response to this objection of regress doesn’t solve the problem either, because the justification of the power to compel is exactly the thing we’re trying to prove. Spooner therefore reiterates the common reason for rejecting positivism, saying “[i]f physical power be the fountain of law, then law and force are synonymous terms. … Are we prepared to admit the principle, that there is no real distinction between law and force? If not, we must reject this definition” (Spooner qtd. in Long “Inside and Outside” 16). If law is to bind, it must be moral, and if law is to be moral, it must come from an authority that can morally give such power. Therefore, whatever is done in the name of law must be something that the person acting on behalf of the law already could have already been allowed to do, prior to legislation.

Spooner’s primary reason, then, for believing that slavery was illegal before the thirteenth amendment, should be pretty obvious at this point. “(1) Written laws, including written constitutions, that violate natural justice as defined by natural rights are not to be enforced by judges. (2) Slavery is unjust because it violates the natural rights of the slave. Therefore, (3) slavery is [illegal] … and not to be enforced by judges. Q.E.D” (Barnett “Was Slavery Constitutional,” pt. III). Most people living today would clearlyaccept premise 2, and even so would many at the time who defended slavery, at least those who held it to be a “necessary evil,” rather than a “positive good.” The heavy lifting, then, for someone wanting to defend a conclusion about “the unconstitutionality of slavery” in 1845, would probably be in establishing premise 1. While Spooner does make this argument in The Unconstitutionality of Slavery, though, and more forcefully defends it at greater length in later works, this only accounts for the introductory material of his constitutional case against slavery. The rest of the book is devoted to a much more peculiar argument against the peculiar institution.

Spooner’s use of natural law as an interpretive mechanism for legislation and how death and hell5 accidentally agreed to ban slavery

Though we have seen Spooner to have no particular love for legislation, and was later the author of an entire book on how the Constitution held “no authority,” he believed it already gave him much of what he wanted in terms of justice. In this section, I will detail why he thought so. Spooner not only believed natural law preceded and bound legislation, but that legislation was a parasitic concept that could not be fully understood without natural law. Even those who find legislation as inherently binding, Spooner contends, must utilize natural law reasoning when considering what it requires of them. Spooner makes this point by bringing attention to the indeterminacy of the words used in written legislation, arguing that the terms used can’t simply be taken at face value, because they often have a nearly infinite number of potential meanings. Author intent did nothing, in Spooner’s view, to substantially reduce this indeterminacy, both because the authors undoubtedly had several intents amongst themselves, and what they meant was not the same thing as what they said. In order to render a single intelligible meaning, then, Spooner argued that our reading must conform to the most morally acceptable interpretation of the text. Not only this, but several places within legislation, especially the Constitution, explicitly use normative terms, and in order to properly interpret those terms, we must have the proper normative judgments. Considering that many of these normative terms appear in statements that refer to the more general mission of the Constitution, this feeds back into how we should interpret the Constitution as a whole. Based on this moral reading, Spooner finds it textually impossible for the Constitution to authorize slavery, and develops alternative, more legally natural, interpretations for those provisions that appear to do so.

As mentioned earlier, Spooner does not believe that legislation can have authority when it conflicts natural law (Spooner “Natural Law” 67). Even so, he is quickly willing to bend on this in The Unconstitutionality of Slavery. He writes: “I shall not insist … upon the principle … that there can be no law contrary to natural right; but shall admit, for the sake of argument, that there may be such laws” (Spooner qtd. in Barnett “Was Slavery Constitutional” pt. III). Instead, he draws upon a principle of interpretation laid down by Chief Justice John Marshall in United States v. Fisher that “where rights are infringed, where fundamental principles are overthrown, where the general system of laws is departed from, the legislative intention must be expressed with irresistible clearness, to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to effect such objects” (Marshall qtd. in Barnett “Was Slavery Unconstitutional” pt. III). From Marshall’s principle, he extrapolates “1st, that no intention, in violation of natural justice and natural right … can be ascribed to the Constitution, unless that intention is expressed in terms that are legally competent to express such an intention; and 2nd, that no terms, except those that are plenary, express, explicit, distinct, unequivocal, and to which no other meaning can be given, are legally competent to authorize or sanction anything contrary to natural right” (Spooner qtd. in Barnett “Was Slavery Constitutional pt. III). Holding that “all language must be construed ‘strictly’ in favor of natural right,” he went on to clarify that “the rule of law is materially different as to the terms necessary to legalize and sanction anything contrary to natural right, and those necessary to legalize things that are consistent with natural right. The latter may be sanctioned by natural implication and inference; the former only by inevitable implication or by language that is full, definite express, explicit, unequivocal, and whose unavoidable import is to sanction the specific wrong intended” (Spooner qtd. in Barnett “Was Slavery Constitutional” pt. III).

Spooner’s interpretive approach and the methodology just outlined, however, did not stand or fall with his unique application of Marshall’s principle. His view also rested on a theory about how we are to read any sort of legislation. Spooner makes a point throughout the book that “the indeterminacy of written words … gave rise to the need for a theory of interpretation” (Barnett “Was Slavery Constitutional,” pt. II). The bare words of the Constitution had so many divergent possible meanings that “unless there were some rule of interpretation for determining which of these various meanings are the true ones, there could be no certainty at all as to the meaning of the statutes and constitutions themselves,” and such an indeterminacy would contradict the idea of law itself, even for those who held bare legislation as law (Spooner qtd. in Barnett “Was Slavery Constitutional,” pt. II). The word “free” was a particularly salient example:

“Yet, the word free is capable of some ten or twenty different senses. So that, by changing the sense of that single word, some ten or twenty different Constitutions would be made out of the same written instrument. But there are, we will suppose, a thousand other words in the Constitution, each of which is capable of from two to ten different senses. So that, by changing the sense of only a single word at a time, several thousands of different Constitutions would be made” (Spooner qtd. in Barnett, “Was Slavery Constitutional,” pt. II). One might think legislative intent is enough to narrow the scope of these meanings, but Spooner contends that this does little if anything to reduce the problem. No doubt the framers6 held different opinions amongst themselves as to what exactly they wanted to the Constitution to mean, so any “legislative intent” would be similarly divergent (Long “Inside and Outside,” pg. 8). In order to render a single, unified meaning to the law, then, “the intentions [the Constitution as written] … expresses must … stand as the intentions of all, and be carried into law, in preference to any contrary intentions, that may havebeen separately, individually, and informally expressed by any one or all the parties on other occasions” (Spooner qtd. in Long “Inside and Outside,” pg. 8). Indeed, “as long as the parties acknowledge the instrument as being their contract, they are each and all estopped by it from saying that they have intentions adverse to it. Its intentions and their intentions are identical, else the parties individually contradict themselves” (Spooner qtd. in Long “Inside and Outside,” pg. 8). Furthermore, even if their intents were uniform, this would not render them the meaning of the Constitution. For if the Constitution is to bind, then it must bind apart from intent, or else “if every individual, after had agreed to a Constitution, could set up his own intentions, his own understandings of the instrument, or his own mental reservations, in opposition to the intentions expressed by the instrument itself, … the consequence would be, that it would have no obligation at all, as a mutual and binding contract” (Spooner qtd. in Long “Inside and Outside,” pg. 8). So, intent is out.

Spooner instead opts for a position in which “if legislators decree X without realizing that X is in fact Y, then their decree must be interpreted as requiring Y even if the legislators never intended this” (Long “Inside and Outside,” pg. 9). Thus, normative terms must be read in light of whatever they actually refer to, if they are to mean anything at all. If I say that I will give you what you are “due,” to fulfill such an obligation, I must give you what you are actually, in fact, due. To say that I will be “just” towards you, I must act in a way that is actually within the bounds of justice when interacting with you. If I enter into a contract to do any of these things, my own views about justice or what you are due should not help to adjudicate the dispute, for Spooner. What should be considered is only what you are actually due, or what it would actually mean to be just towards you. As Spooner writes in “Vices Are Not Crimes,” “[f]or a government to declare a vice to be a crime, and to punish it as such, is an attempt to falsify the very nature of things. It as absurd as it would be to declare truth to be falsehood, or falsehood truth” (Spooner “Vices Are Not Crimes,” pt. I). This gets us to something even broader when consider that the Constitution explicitly sets itself out to accomplish tasks named with normative terms like “Justice,” “perfect,” “domestic Tranquility,” “general Welfare,” “Blessings of Liberty,” etc. (Constitution, Preamble). This means that we can extrapolate from the Constitution itself something like Spooner’s application of Marshall’s principle. Because when we’re in doubt about the intended reference of a term, we can turn to what the Constitution lists as its primary.

We may now turn to Spooner’s analysis of the Constitution’s relationship with slavery. As the Spooner-influenced philosopher of law Randy Barnett notes, “there are three passages in the original Constitution that are commonly thought to refer to and constitutionally legitimate slavery” (Barnett “Was Slavery Constitutional,” pt. III). I will list them here in full, with Barnett’s brief descriptions of how each is taken to refer to slavery:

” The first is in Article I, Section 2:

Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several State, which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. [53]

The term, “other Persons” in this clause is interpreted as referring to slaves. The second passage is also in Article 1, but in Section 9:

The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person. [54]

The term “Importation of such Persons” in this clause is interpreted as to referring to slaves. The third passage is in Article IV, section 2:

No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due. [55]

The term “person held to Service or Labour” in this clause is interpreted as referring to slaves.” (Barnett “Was Slavery Constitutional,” pt. III)

Notice that the words “slave” and “slavery” literally appear nowhere in the text. “Not even the name of the thing, alleged to be sanctioned, is given” (Spooner qtd. in Barnett “Was Slavery Constitutional,” pt. III). All the same, these references seem unavoidable at first glance. To begin with Spooner’s more naturally legal interpretations, notice that the alleged slaves are continually referred to as “persons.” Spooner contends that there is no textual basis for denying that “’the people of the United States,’” who in the preamble set out to “establish Justice … and secure the Blessings of Liberty” (Constitution, Preamble) “included the whole of the ten people of the United States. And if the whole of the people are parties to it, it must, if possible, be construed as so to make it such contract as each and every individual might reasonably agree to” (Spooner qtd. in Barnett “Was Slavery Constitutional,” pt. III). As Barnett relays Spooner’s analysis, “Persons who are a part of the People cannot be presumed to assent to a document that would hold them in bondage. And, short of this, the government of the United States would not rest on the consent of the governed” (Barnett “Was Slavery Constitutional,” pt. III). Returning to the importance of normatively-charged terms, “more fundamentally, creatures who are persons are in possession of certain inalienable natural rights. This much was conceded by those advocates of slavery who were compelled to argue that slaves were not people. Thus, if slaves are not people, and if it is permissible to enslave another only if that other creature is not a person,

then [the passages referring to ‘persons’] cannot be referring to or sanctioning slavery, since they explicitly refer to ‘persons’ and persons cannot justly be held as slaves” (Barnett, “Was Slavery Constitutional,” pt. III).

Fair enough, but what about the fact that the first instance explicitly refers to these “Persons” in contrast to “free Persons”? If these persons are not a part of the set “free Persons,” they must obviously be unfree persons, and a statute referring to unfree persons must be referring to slaves. Barnett relays that “Spooner argues, at length and with considerable authority, that ‘English law had for centuries used the word ‘free’ as describing persons possessing citizenship, or some other franchise or peculiar privilege – as distinguished from aliens, and persons not possessed of such franchise or privilege’” (Barnett “Was Slavery Constitutional, pt. III). Construing “’free’ persons” as full citizens furthermore makes sense with the surrounding text: a resident alien, or “’partial citizen’ is counted as two-thirds a full citizen”7 (Barnett “Was Slavery Constitutional, pt. III). Viewing these vague “persons,” whose status those intending to mean slaves were too afraid to name, as resident aliens also makes sense of the “Importation of persons” clause: immigration (Barnett “Was Slavery Constitutional,” pt. III). As for “person held to Service or Labour,” to be delivered to those “due” their labor, the word “due” is crucial. “Due” is a normative term, and “due” refers to obligations. No one can be obligated to serve another in the sense of slavery, so “due” cannot possibly refer to slavery. The worry that “persons held to Service or Labour” must, unavoidably, refer to slaves is quickly eliminated with a counter-example from Spooner: “a condemned criminal is ‘held to labor’ – yet he is not owned as property” (Spooner qtd. in Barnett “Was Slavery Constitutional,” pt. III). Spooner then backs up his interpretations by pointing to other passages that would, logically speaking, outlaw slavery by necessity, from the writ of Habeas Corpus (Barnett “Was Slavery Constitutional,” pt. III) to “a republican form of government,” to the right of self-defence,8 to protections against “domestic violence,”9 (Long “Inside and Outside,” pg. 6), and so on and so on.

Barnett reflects that “[a]lthough the founding generation is today often condemned for its refusal to abolish slavery, were Spooner’s interpretive method to have been adopted, slaveholders would have been the ones to condemn the framers for their failure of nerve. For they failed to legally sanction the crime they could not bring themselves to name” (Barnett “Was Slavery Constitutional,” pt. III). In discussing direct reference theory in application to Spooner’s theory of legal interpretation, Long (pg. 10) compares the public nature of language in interpretation to the public nature of the rules of a game like chess. Both involve combinations of actions taken by speakers or players and the public rules of the language or game in order to form meanings or moves. In the same way that one can accidentally facilitate in their own checkmate, so can one accidentally say something with a meaning they did not intend. Returning to the Garrisonian view that the Constitution was a “covenant with death” and an “agreement with hell,” this leads us to an interesting development on that metaphor. Assuming the morally charged nature of the Garrisonians’ attack on the Constitution as popularly conceived, at least in so far as it legitimated slavery,10 one might say that Spooner has allowed death and hell to slowly facilitate in their own checkmate. Regardless of their intentions, the words they took in order to authorize slavery led to a document demanding its immediate abolition.

Antonin Scalia’s defense of death and hell: The challenge of originalism

Though Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia cited Spooner’s The Unconstitutionality of Slavery in the Heller decision, it is unlikely that he would agree with the interpretive method employed in the book. In fact, a strong objection to the entire Spoonerite project might come formed from an originalist account of textualism such as the one outlined by Scalia in his “Common-Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws.” Scalia, agrees with views like Spooner’s that legislative intent is a worthless way of interpreting the text of statutes (Scalia “Common,” 151). However, this does not lead Scalia to anything resembling the morally-charged view of legal interpretation that Spooner takes on. On the contrary, Scalia states “Congress can enact foolish statutes as well as wise ones, and it is not for the courts to decide which is which and rewrite the former” (Scalia “Common,” 153). Scalia

then makes the distinction between textualist accounts that do accept moralized interpretations of the Constitution and those that don’t. In Dred Scott, the Supreme Court held that one could not be deprived of life, liberty, or property “without due process” in a moralized way – a moralized way that saw slave owners’ property rights over their slaves as sacrosanct11 (154). Rejecting any sort of moralized “due process” clause, Scalia states “Well, it may or may not be a good thing to guarantee additional liberties, but the Due Process Clause quite obviously does not bear that interpretation. By its inescapable terms, it guarantees only process. Property can be taken by the state; liberty can be taken; even life can be taken; but not without the process that our traditions require – notably, a valid enacted law and a fair trial” (Scalia “Common,” 154-155).

The difference, then, between a Scalian and Spoonerite view of textualism, is that Scalia takes the words – including normative ones – to mean “how the text of the Constitution was originally understood” (Scalia “Common,” 155). Once again, Scalia’s view is not one that bases the meaning of words in the intent of the author, but in what the words could have been reasonably been taken to mean at the time they were written. “What [Scalia] look[s] for in the Constitution is precisely what [he] look[s] for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended” (155-156). Scalia describes “the Great Divide”on Constitutional interpretation as one that is “not between Framers’ intent and objective meaning, but rather … between original meaning (whether derived from Framers’ intent or not) and current meaning” (156). Applying this to Spooner’s concerns, the average person at the time the Constitution was written clearly understood “other persons” to refer to slaves. Knowing that those “persons” were not understood to be within the set “we the people,” those persons were not people by the original meaning. So on and so forth, and the Constitution of death and hell turns out to have been the proper interpretation at the time.

Such an objection and competing scheme of interpretation, however, ultimately fails. Philosopher of law Ronald Dworkin’s rejoinder to Scalia in many places sounds exactly like how we might imagine Spooner to have responded to such a view. Dworkin agrees (just as Spooner would have) with Scalia that what the text says, not the intent of the legislature, is what matters. He differs from Scalia, though, in just the way we’d expect Spooner to differ from Scalia. Dworkin draws a line between “two forms of originalism: ‘semantic’ originalism, which insists that the rights-granting caluses be read to say what those who made them intended to say, and ‘expectation’ originalism, which holds that these clauses should be understood to have the consequences that those who made them expected them to have” (Dworkin 162-163). A semantic originalist, for Dworkin, holds that the meaning of a text is what the actual referents of the words, independent of intention or expectation, are. An expectation originalist, by contrast, holds that the text refers to what everyone at the time it was written expected it to mean (Dworkin 163). The semantic originalist, furthermore, tends to view the Constitution as laying down general moral principles, rather than specific edicts. Those who put the idea of “equal protection of the laws,” for example, into the Constitution no doubt did not expect it to be one that would ban, if taken seriously, racial segregation. This does not change the fact, however, that this is in fact what “equal protection of the laws” means (163).

In a similar assessment of the normative content of “cruel and unusual punishment,” Dworkin rejects the view that such punishments refer specifically to “punishments generally thought to be cruel at the time they spoke,” and can therefore not be taken to ban capital punishment (163). Dworkin then shows the expectation originalist to be in something of a bind. For the text does not seem to admit of an expectationist reading, even under its own reasoning. If the meaning of “cruel and unusual punishment” were expected to mean “punishments widely regarded as cruel and unusual at the date of this enactment,” the framers of the Constitution would have said so (163). So it seems more sensible to suggest that what was laid down was “an abstract principle forbidding whatever punishments are in fact cruel and unusual” (163). Similarly, in the case of the First Amendment, Dworkin shows that the expected reading was in fact, the moralized “semantic originalist” meaning of a general principle. For when debating the issue later, past framers appealed not to their earlier expectations, but to things such as “the moral authority of Blackstone” and “the logic of freedom” (165).

Dworkin also gives another, very Spooneresque objection to Scalia’s expectation originalism. Assuming that normative claims refer to actual facts, a premise that Scalia is unlikely to reject, there is a fact of the matter about whether or not a given action is “just” or “unjust.” If there is a fact of the matter as to whether or not something is “cruel,” then the way that the term was used at the time of legislation is completely irrelevant. The legislation refers instead to what actually is or is not “cruel.” This is the case even if other parts of the legislation imply a failure to acknowledge the “cruelty” of a given punishment.12 The analogy Dworkin gives is that of a hypothetical piece of legislation that bans the “hunting of animals that are members of ‘endangered species’ and then, later … imposes special license requirements for hunting … minks” (Dworkin 163). This would clearly indicate that the legislators did not believe minks were endangered. If it turned out, though, that minks were endangered, the fact that the text overtly and unavoidably implies elsewhere that they were not endangered would not make them non-endangered for the purposes of legal interpretation (163). The same is true of capital punishment: if capital punishment is in fact cruel, then overt and unavoidable references to it elsewhere do not make it non-cruel (163).

Scalia’s response on this last point is puzzling. On one hand, he re-emphasizes his expectation originalist reading: “what [the eighth amendment] … abstracts … is [a moral principle, but] not a moral principle that philosophers can play with in the future, but rather the existing society’s assessment of what is cruel. It means not … ‘whatever may be considered cruel from one generation to the next,’ but ‘what we would consider cruel today’; otherwise it would be no protection against the moral perceptions of a future,more brutal, generation. It is, in other words, rooted in the moral perceptions of the time” (Scalia “Rejoinder” 167). On the other hand, in responding to the “endangered species” analogy, Scalia states that “unlike animal populations, however, ‘moral principles,’ most of us think, are permanent’” (Scalia “Rejoinder” 167).

If moral principles are permanent, then they are no doubt the same today as they were in the eighteenth century. If they’re the same today as they were in the eighteenth century, then a moralized view like Dworkin’s (or Spooner’s) is not asking that we interpret legislation (Constitution included) in terms of “whatever may be considered cruel from one generation to the next,” but in terms of what actually is cruel. To reduce the conflict between Scalia and Dworkin’s interpretive methods to one of whether we should go by current moral standards or the moral standards of the time a text was written is to assume relativism. If we don’t assume relativism, then Dworkin’s appeal is not to uncritically accept current moral opinion, but to interpret the text according to the actual truth of those permanent moral principles. Assuming capital punishment is actually cruel, then, it has been unconstitutional ever since the Constitution was written. Moral opinion shifting against capital punishment, then, would not signify capital punishment becoming unconstitutional, but the general public realizing that capital punishment is unconstitutional. In so far as we accept moral realism, then, an originalist appeal like Scalia’s fails, and would fail to answer Spooner’s reasoning behind the unconstitutionality of slavery. Having established Spooner’s natural law framework both as a way of evaluating positive legislation from the outside, and as a way of interpreting positive legislation from the inside, we can move from the issue of slavery to the issue of monopoly government.

The illegality of monopoly government

Given Spooner’s hardline view that natural law precedes positive legislation and rules out any legislation contrary to it, it is easy to see why he held monopoly government to be illegal. He did not, however, oppose establishing or maintaining legal systems. Spooner had high respect for the importance and need for institutions to judge disputes and enforce laws. In “Natural Law: The Science of Justice,” he writes that “[a]lthough it is the right of anybody and everybody – of any one man, or set of men, no less than another – to repel injustice, and compel justice, for themselves and for all who may be wronged, yet to avoid the errors that are liable to result from haste and passion, and that everybody, who desires it, may rest secure in the assurance of protection, without a resort to force, it is evidently desirable that men should associate, so far as they freely and voluntarily can do so, for the maintenance of justice among themselves and for mutual protection against other wrongdoers. It is also in the highest degree desirable that they should agree upon some plan or system of judicial proceedings, which in the trial of causes, should secure caution, deliberation, thorough investigation, and, as far as possible, freedom from every influence but the simple desire to dojustice” (Spooner “Natural Law,” 56). This – the need for third party arbitration, and the provision of the common defense – is fairly standard rationale for establishing a legal system, which for most people necessarily means establishing a monopoly government. Yet Spooner quickly clarifies that “such associations can be rightful and desirable only in so far as they are purely voluntary. No man can rightfully be coerced into joining one, or supporting one, against his will” (56). Given Spooner’s view that violating one’s rights to their person or property is naturally illegal, compelling them to join or support any institution charged with providing legal services or security is also illegal.

One might object on the grounds that, for reasons given by social contract theorists, participation in a monopoly government ultimately is voluntary, as long as that government is democratic. This is the sort of argument that Spooner devotes a most of his time to in No Treason: The Constitution of No Authority. To summarize the entirety of that book: what matters, morally, is not the “treason” de jure of going against a government that one has never entered into an actual contract with, but the “treason” de facto of going against contracts one has actually entered into. Actual, personal, individual consent is required, not the consent of others on your behalf. Spooner also considers this a necessary component of the concept of treason: “Clearly this individual consent is indispensable to the idea of treason; for if a man has never consented or agreed to support a government, he breaks no faith in refusing to support it. And if he makes war upon it, he does so as an open enemy, and not as a traitor that is, as a betrayer, or treacherous friend” (Spooner “No Treason,” 7).

One might also object that any talk about individual rights, let alone of a legal system, presupposes monopoly government. It is beyond the scope of this paper to prove otherwise, but several aspects of law that many people today assume require monopoly government have existed in the past without it. Based upon those historical examples, some contemporary theorists have defended, in great detail, the possibility of such a system functioning in the modern world.13 If nothing else, Spooner’s arguments show that if it possible to have stable rights protection and enforcement without monopoly government, natural law requires such an arrangement.

Regarding the idea of monopoly government and the principle of overriding individual rights with counterfactual claims to consent, Spooner contends that “If that principle be not the principle of the Constitution, the fact should be known. If it be the principle of the Constitution, the Constitution itself should be at once overthrown” (Spooner “No Treason,” 3). The next few sections will take on the task of making known an interpretation of the Constitution, based on the reasoning used by Spooner in The Unconstitutionality of Slavery, that does not include this principle. It will be argued that the Constitution does not, in fact, authorize monopoly government, but instead, a purely voluntary association.

Sections in the Constitution that seem to clearly authorise monopoly government

It will be useful at this point to list those places within the Constitution that, on face, appear to explicitly and unavoidably refer to the authorization and construction of a monopoly government like the one we currently live under. In what follows, I will quote directly those sections that do so and note why they appear to unavoidably authorize monopoly government.

In the preamble, the text states that the document is “in Order to form a more perfect Union” (Constitution, Preamble). This appears to bind previously independent parties into a single, monopoly government. In article I, section 1, it is said that “all legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,” which appears to give a monopoly on determining the law. Article I, section 6 states that “Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same.” Saying that Senators and Representatives will receive compensation for their services by law seems to mean that they can forcibly acquire such compensation. Saying that they’re privileged from arrest appears to put them as legally superior to others, as well as require that no other legal institution may arrest them for a crime. In article I, section 7, it states that if a bill goes through the usual processes and succeeds, “it shall become a Law.” This reads as if it gives legislators theauthority to create law.

Article I, section 8 includes several statements that appear to authorize monopoly government. It begins by saying “The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare to the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.” This appears to give congress the ability to compel others to pay for its services. “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;” appears to authorize the power to impose limitations on trade. “[S]ecuring for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” appears to allow the power to grant forced monopolies in the form of intellectual property. “To declare War,” as well as “To raise and support Armies,” and “To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;” appear to authorize the creation of a military force, typically a function of monopoly governments. “To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress” implies the ability to subordinate militias to the power of the United States, making it a monopoly government. “To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District … as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States,” implies a territorial monopoly, which is the distinguishing feature of a monopoly government. Finally, it allows for making “all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,” not only authorizes something its calling a “government,” but also allows that government to create any law deemed “necessary and proper” for the execution of its powers.

In article II, section 1, it states that “the executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” This appears to give the said President executive status in a monopoly government. Section 2 states that this “President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.” This, once again, appears to subordinate militias and defense agencies to the power of the President, making him the leader of a monopoly government. Article III, section 1, says that “the judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,” which appears to give a monopoly on final arbitration to this court. Section 3 defines treason, which appears to limit the power to oppose the United States. Article IV, section 4 requires that “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government,” which appears to refer to those monopoly governments referred to as “republics.” In Article VI the Constitution declares of itself, and “the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof” that it “shall be the supreme Law of the Land,” which seems to unavoidably declare that the Constitution authorizes a monopoly government which may maintain territorial monopoly.

The amendments have less such provisions, but there’s still a couple worth noting. Amendment VI states that those accused of crimes may “have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,” which implies the ability to force others to take part in the legal system. Amendment XVI says “Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”

Sections of the Constitution that seem to clearly ban monopoly government

Yet there are several portions of the Constitution that would logically, if taken in a moralized way, ban monopoly government. The preamble declares that the purpose of the Constitution is, among other things, to “establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, … promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” If we assume a libertarian theory of justice, this means everything in the Constitution must be toward that end. A Constitution geared towards promoting those things, in so far as they are interpreted through a libertarian theory of justice, cannot, then, establish a monopoly government.

Article I, section 9, states that “No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States.” If no title of nobility is to be granted, then those in positions of authority within the United States government must also be legal equals to those outside of those positions. If they are to be legal equals, they can’t compel and command others by force. If they can’t compel and command others by force, they can’t set up or maintain a monopoly government. Article I, section 10 states that there shall be no “Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” If no laws impairing the obligation of contracts are to be banned, one must be allowed tocontract with other institutions for the provision of legal and defense services. Article I, section 9 also says that “no State shall, without the Consent of Congress … engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.” Admittedly, it appears that different things might be the case if the “consent of congress” is granted, but otherwise, this demands that the forming of an alternative legal or defense institution (which is non-invasive) must be allowed.

Amendment I states that “Congress shall make no law … abridging … the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” This in particular is crucial. Obviously, it bans any attempt to stifle free association, which includes the voluntary formation of an alternative defense or legal institution. Also, though, it requires that people be allowed to “petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” If people are allowed to petition the government for a redress of grievances, they must be allowed to seek full restitution for crimes committed against them by the government. In order to do that, there must be a neutral third party arbiter to oversee such a trial. This requires that the government does not have a monopoly on its services.

Amendment II demands that “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” If the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, then they must be allowed to amass the resources necessary for creating their own protection associations – “a well regulated Militia.” There may be some doubts here because of “necessary to the security of a free State,” but this will be addressed in the next section. Amendment IV states that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonablesearches and seizures, shall not be violated.” The word “reasonable” is normatively charged. Assuming a libertarian theory of justice, searches and seizures by the government unrelated to defending against a crime or seeking restitution for one are necessarily unreasonable. This also includes the forced collection of taxes, which seize one’s property.

Amendment V holds that no one shall be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Antonin Scalia’s thoughts to the contrary, the process that is due to one is a just process. If one’s life, liberty, or property must be taken in the course of protecting another person, it may be done. If one has the property of another person, it may be taken from them and returned to their victim. These are processes of the law that are due. Similarly, the only just compensation for private property being taken for public use is one that the other party agrees to. If they do not agree to the transaction, no compensation whatsoever could potentially be just, and therefore the property cannot be taken. This interpretation of the Fifth Amendment yields monopoly government impossible, because if it can’t engage in “unreasonable” searches or seizures, nor can it take property without “just” compensation, it can only engage with others through voluntary means.

Amendment VIII states that “excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” Just like our analysis of “due” and “unreasonable,” “excessive” is a normatively charged term. Any fines imposed, or bail required to leave jail, when either is for a non-crime (in Spooner’s sense) is necessarily excessive. Any punishments, furthermore, that go beyond whatever is necessary to seek restitution, is “cruel.” This places yet another strong presumption against monopoly government for the same reasons mentioned in our discussion of the Fifth Amendment. The Ninth Amendment takes this further, and explicitly reminds us that “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” This once again emphasizes that when in doubt, our interpretations of the Constitution must be strictly construed in favor of pre-existing liberties. The Tenth Amendment does the same by saying that those “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” In other words, unless the Constitution unavoidably and explicitly gives the United States government a power, it does not have that power.

Amendment XIII states that “neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” While living under a monopoly government is not slavery, it is to some degree involuntary servitude, for the reasons like those outlined by Spooner in No Treason. If all innocent people cannot be forced to follow the commands of another person, there can be no monopoly government. If innocent people can be forced to follow the commands of a monopoly government, there exists involuntary servitude for those not convicted of crimes. Also, refusal to submit to the United States can’t be a crime in this context, either, because “crime” is a normatively charged word (Spooner “Vices Are Not Crimes”). Amendment XIV repeats that no State “shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;” and adds “nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” This addition regarding equal protection of the laws calls once again for legal equality, which bans monopoly government for all of the reasons we mentioned in our discussion of the clause forbidding titles of nobility. There exist, then, several portions of the Constitution which give us reason to hold a strong presumption against monopoly government.

Not only do these portions of the Constitution give us reasons to hold a strong presumption against monopoly government, they seem primary. Most of them speak in unequivocal language, and refer to moral principles that guide the Constitution. By referring to moral principles that guide the Constitution, they give us a light as to how we might narrow down other possible meanings of less normatively-charged but still indeterminate phrases elsewhere in the Constitution. This means that if one of two clear statements in the Constitution is to bend, it will be ones like those in section VI of this paper, not those in the present section.

The Constitution made coherent: Liberty through integrity

Even still, we need some way to make sense of those passages that seem to clearly authorize monopoly government. To begin, it is perhaps necessary to address the use of the phrase “government” in the Constitution. If anything is to unequivocally, unavoidably, and without alternative interpretation, authorize a monopoly government, it would seem to be literally referring to what is being formed as “government.” Similarly, the continued use of the phrase “state,” especially in the name of that thing being formed, “the United States.” It’s not that simple, though.

While most anarchists today are likely to use the words “government” or “state” to refer specifically to a centralized, monopoly government, this has not always been the case. Auberon Herbert, nineteenth- century English anarchist in all but name supported institutions he refers to as “government” and “the state,” but they have certain characteristics that would make them decidedly not “governments” or “states” in contemporary discussions. Notably, Herbert holds that “[t]here is no moral foundation for taking taxes by force,” and that any involvement with a “government” must be voluntary (Herbert). Similarly, Gustave de Molinari, an early market anarchist and advocate of non-State legal institutions stated that “The future thus belongs neither to the absorption of society by the state, as the communists and collectivists suppose, nor to the suppression of the state, as the [non-market] anarchists and nihilists dream, but to the diffusion of the state within society” (Molinari qtd. in Long “The Economic,” 1). Albert Jay Nock, twentieth-century American anarchist, also makes a distinction between “government” and “the State,” in which the former refers to any rights-protecting organization, while the latter refers to monopoly government (Stromberg). Finally, Lysander Spooner himself makes this odd turn. As Roderick Long notes, throughout Spooner’s work, he uses the term “government” to refer to “voluntary security arrangements under anarchy,” which “derive their just powers from the contractual consent of their members” (Long 19). So, we are not forced by the text to interpret “government” and even “States” as anything beyond some sort of organization formed for the purpose of protecting rights. Since we are not forced by the text to interpret it as anything beyond that, and we are forced by our interpretive method to interpret strictly in favor of natural rights, that is how we will interpret the words “government” and “state.” Since “state” is perhaps the more contentious of the two, we can further stipulate that “United States” simply is the proper name of the rights protection agency in question, and that its subdivisions, it refers to as “States.” These have “jurisdictions,” but not in the sense of territorial monopolies, and instead merely in the sense that any branch of any organization has a “jurisdiction.”

Now with what exactly it is the Constitution is forming in mind, it becomes easier to see how it doesn’t form what most people think it does. The “more perfect Union” referred to in the preamble just means a more efficiently run organization. The “all legislative Powers” referred to in article I, section 1, refers only to “all legislative powers” for the purpose of the United States’s own policies. As for legislators receiving compensation “by Law,” of course they receive compensation by law. Specifying legal conventions is their profession, and that is how they make money. No compulsion is implied. Their “privilege from arrest” only applies to agents of the United States. All that saying a passed bill will “become a Law” means is that it specifies legal conventions.

In Article I, section 8 all that the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises” means is that the United States is allowed to charge for its services. This interpretation is assisted by how the section continues: “to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare to the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.” The reason “common Defense … to the United States” reveals that those being “taxed” are those who have voluntarily associated themselves with the United States, or else this defense would not be “common.” Saying that these will be “uniform throughout the United States” shows even more specifically that the charges apply only to those within (associated with) the United States. It is not “uniform throughout all those being made to pay,” nor is it “uniform throughout the United States’s territorial monopoly,” it is “uniform throughout the United States.” The clause “To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;” authorizes the United States’ ability to control trade with itself and those foreign Nations and/or Indian Tribes, though it does not authorize authority to control anyone else’s trade activities. It regulates trade “among the several States” because the “several States” are subdivisions of itself.
“[S]ecuring for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” only makes sure that those authors and inventors employed by the United States receives compensation for their work. It does not make an intellectual property claim that other parties must be made to respect. The several sections allowing for declaring war and raising military forces refer to allowing for the creation of a more thorough defense force in the event that a rogue defense agency or a nation-state decides to attack. The key phrase in “To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress” is “as may be employed in the Service of the United States.” Only those militias actually being employed by the United States may be under its governance. “To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District … as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States,” only stipulates that they retain property rights over their headquarters. Allows for making “all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,” only authorizes just that – all legislation that would be necessary and proper (normatively charged terms) to execute these other Powers, which do not form a monopoly government. Anything that formed a monopoly government would neither be necessary to accomplish any of the previous tasks, nor would it be proper.

The “executive Power” that “shall be vested in a President of the United States of America” in article II, section 1, obviously only refers to a head of the organization. Just as earlier, the key phrase in “President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.” Is “when called into the actual Service of the United States.” When they are not “called into the actual service” – i.e., in a voluntary contractual agreement – the President has no power to arbitrarily command them. When article III, section 1 says that “the judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,” this just means that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested therein, and says nothing of anyone else’s judicial power. Treason only refers to what Spooner called “treason in fact.” The requirement in article IV, section 4 that “The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government,” does not mean that each state has is a monopoly government in the form of a Republic. Instead, it means that the organizational structure of each state will resemble those of republics. Perhaps most interesting is Article VI. For when the Constitution says that it and “the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof … shall be the supreme Law of the Land,” there are two ways of reading this claim. One is to say that “whatever the Constitution and the legislation it authorizes are, are therefore the law of the land.” The other is to say “whatever the law of the land is, is therefore how you should interpret the Constitution and the legislation it authorizes.” So in fact, this clause that seems to write in a sort of legal positivism is quickly and immediately reversible to say that only the law of the land (natural law) can be taken as the meaning of the Constitution.

When amendment VI gives those accused of crimes the right to “have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,” it only gives the accused the right to compel those who are employed by the United States. As for Amendment XVI, “Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration” just means that charges for the United States’s services can be taken out of the paychecks of those customers who are also employees of the United States.


What’s the point of all this? It might be the case that natural law dictates that people have an ethical obligation to resist monopoly government and any other violation of natural rights. It might further be the case that legislation should be interpreted through natural law. Anyone, though, who argued a case on such grounds would, as a best case scenario, be laughed out of court. Judges who made any decisions on these grounds would be acting very, very independently, to put it lightly. So while this paper does seriously contend that a natural law view like Spooner’s is correct, and that legislation (contracts included) should be interpreted in such terms, that’s not the main point. The main point is to underscore a conceptual incoherence in the Constitution, and non-libertarian legal systems more generally.

Even robustly non-libertarian readers would likely want to claim that when the Constitution talks about securing “the Blessings of Liberty,” outlawing “involuntary servitude,” ensuring “equal protection under the laws,” or barring the taking of “life, liberty, or property without the due process of law,” that these words mean things. Yet if they do mean anything serious, and can be allowed to reach their logical conclusions, they rule out non-libertarian legal systems. This poses a difficulty for the average believer in the Constitution, who wants both those strictly defended liberties and the non-libertarian legal order the rest of the Constitution is enforced as authorizing (without the sort of reading employed here).

Detailing how similar, libertarian undercurrents can be found in the principles behind even the most non-libertarian legal institutions, Roderick Long wonders why those undercurrents might be so prevalent. “Perhaps the answer is that the libertarian aspects are essential to a legal system while the unlibertarian aspects are accidental” (Long “Inside and Outside,” pg. 30). When we think of the tasks ostensibly common to all legal systems, this seems plausible. Most, if not all, legal systems at their core are charged with the mission of protecting the person and property of its citizenry. Yet once they use legislative force to attain other ends, they run into contradictions. Spooner refers to the example we have looked at specifically – monopoly government – as a contradiction for a legal system in “Natural Law: The Science of Justice”:

“Certainly no man can rightfully be required to join, or support, an association whose protection he does not desire. Nor can any man be reasonable or rightfully expected to join, or support, any association whose plans or method of proceeding, he does not approve, as likely to accomplish its professed purpose of maintaining justice, and at the same time itself avoid doing injustice. To join, or support, one that would, in his opinion, be inefficient, would be absurd. To join or support one that, in his opinion, would itself do injustice, would be criminal” (56-57).

Randy Barnett emphasizes compossibility as an advantage of libertarian rights theory on a more general level, and notes the contradictions that must inevitably come up if one accepts a different view:

“It is commonly thought, however, that valid rights may conflict with each other. According to this view, the responsibility of the political and legal processes is to mediate between conflicting rights; rights are mere claims, which must be assessed and compared with each other rather than the conceptual means by which the validity of claims are assessed. This view results from an inflation of rights. The more different kinds of rights that are recognized, the more there is potential for conflict between alleged rights and the more that rights start to look like mere claims rather than valid or dispositive claims. If asserting a right does not establish the validity of one’s claim over that of another then some other way must then be found to settle the conflict among competing rights. Obviously, rights themselves provide no basis for such a settlement” (Barnett “Structure,” 91).

The right to security in one’s own person was clearly a more fundamental right than the right to own another person. This was why Spooner was able to pull such crisply anti-slavery sentiment from a document intended to found a legal system that authorized slavery. Without the sentiments that logically led to his anti- slavery conclusions, it would not be a legal system. The same is true, I have hoped to show, of even a much more radical claim. In so far as a document establishes the necessary conditions to founding a legal system, it also establishes principles that logically lead themselves to rejecting monopoly government. In other words, all constitutions set up to institutionalize one sort of rights violation or another, those “covenants with death and agreements with hell,” are ultimately doomed to fail.


  1. “Monopoly government,” here, will refer specifically to any institution which maintains an enforced monopoly on the provision of legal services (or at least the right to be “final arbiter” in any dispute) in a given area. This might be described elsewhere as simply “government,” or a “State,” but as we will explain below, for the purposes of this particular paper, we specifically use the term “monopoly government” when referring to such an institution.
  2. Admittedly, this is a fairly large assumption. The reader can take the paper’s current size as a justification of that leap. That being said, a defence of sorts will be offered (indirectly) in the conclusion.
  3. Notice, by the way, that the title claims that vices are not crimes, not simply that they should not be crimes.
  4. Keeping in line with Spooner’s views on legal interpretation, we can take him here to obviously refer to legislation out of step with natural law, rather than legislation in line with natural law. Legislation in line with natural law, he does not take to be evil, but superfluous. Indeed, “if legislation be consistent with natural justice, and the natural or intrinsic obligation of the contract of government, it is obligatory: if not, not” (Spooner qtd. in Barnett “Was Slavery Constitutional,” pt. II)
  5. This is in reference to the William Lloyd Garrison quote mentioned at the beginning of the paper.
  6. This problem is actually even more extreme for Spooner, as he believed that if any intent were to matter, it would be that of the ratifiers (Long “Inside and Outside,” pg. 8).
  7. No doubt even this interpretation, as it presupposes an inequality of liberty between full citizens and resident aliens, does not fully align with Spooner’s view of natural law as libertarian justice. However, it is also no doubt a considerably more naturally legal reading than one that authorises slavery.
  8. Interestingly, Spooner’s reasoning here was cited by Scalia in the Heller decision.
  9. Ironically, “domestic violence” was likely intended as a reference to slave revolts.
  10. Here I make the further assumption that contemporary readers are willing to sign onto such an assumption.
  11. The conclusion in Dred Scott is obviously not one that Spooner agreed with, but Scalia’s point applies as much to Spooner’s abolitionist view of the moralised Constitution as it would a pro-slavery one.
  12. Here, Dworkin’s interpretive method is actually more radical than Spooner’s. Spooner’s does not seem to allow for moralized interpretations to override overt and unavoidable references to the naturally illegal aspects in a piece of legislation. If Spooner were to sign on to this part of Dworkin’s interpretive method, perhaps his case in The Unconstitutionality of Slavery would have been much shorter.
  13. For the definitive anthology on such proposals, see Stringham 2007. Also see the later chapters of Barnett 1998.

Works Cited

Barnett, Randy E. The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law. Oxford: Clarendon, 1998.

Barnett, Randy E. “Was Slavery Unconstitutional Before the Thirteenth Amendment?: Lysander Spooner’s Theory of Interpretation.” Pacific Law Journal (1997): n. pag.

Dworkin, Ronald. “Comment.” 161-69.
Herbert, Auberon. “ESSAY THREE. A POLITICIAN IN SIGHT OF HAVEN – Auberon Herbert, The

Right and Wrong of Compulsion by the State and Other Essays (1978 Ed.) [1885].” Online Library of Liberty.
Liberty Fund, n.d. Web. 12 May 2013.

Long, Roderick. Inside and Outside Spooner’s Natural Law Jurisprudence. Workshop on Natural Law and the Foundations of Liberalism: 23rd IVR World Congress of Philosophy, Krakow, 27 Dec. 2007. 10 May 2013.

Long, Roderick. The Economic Dissolution of the State. 2011 Prague Conference on Political Economy, 2011. 12 May 2013.

Scalia, Antonin. “Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System: The Role of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws.” N.p.: n.p., n.d. 151-60.

Spooner, Lysander. “Natural Law: The Science of Justice.” (1882): n. pag. Rpt. in Left & Right: A Journal of Libertarian Thought. 1st ed. Vol. 3. New York: n.p., 1967. 53-67.

Spooner, Lysander. “Vices Are Not Crimes.”, 1873.

Spooner, Lysander. No Treason: The Constitution of No Authority. Boston: 1867.

Stringham, Edward, ed. Anarchy & the Law. Independent Institute, 2007.

Stromberg, Joseph. “Albert Jay Nock and Alternative History.” The Freeman. Foundation for Economic

Education, 1 Nov. 2008. Web. 12 May 2013.
The Constitution of the United States. National Center for Constitutional Studies, 2009 (1787).

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#FreeBritney and the importance of self-ownership #FreeBritney y la importancia de la autopropiedad #FreeBritney et l’importance de la propriété de soi #FreeBritney e a importância da autopropriedade #FreeBritney und die bedeutung der eigenverantwortung A definition of freedom Una definición de libertad Une définition de la liberté Uma definição de liberdade Eine definition von freiheit A monopoly on violence Un monopolio sobre la violencia Un monopole sur la violence Um monopólio da violência Ein gewaltmonopol A university built by the invisible hand Una universidad construida por la mano invisible Une université construite par la main invisible Uma universidade construída pela mão invisível Eine universität die von der unsichtbaren hand gebaut wurde Abstain from beans Abstenerse de frijoles S’abstenir de haricots Abster-se de feijão Verzichten sie auf bohnen Activities Activities Activities Activities Activities Against all nations and borders Contra todas las naciones y fronteras Contre toutes les nations et frontières Contra todas as nações e fronteiras Gegen alle nationen und grenzen Against authority Contra la autoridad Contre l’autorité Contra autoridade Gegen autorität Against woman suffrage Contra el sufragio femenino Contre le suffrage des femmes Contra o sufrágio feminino Gegen das frauenwahlrecht Altruism does not exist El altruismo no existe L’altruisme n’existe pas O altruísmo não existe Altruismus gibt es nicht An anti-capitalism anarcho-capitalist Un anticapitalismo anarcocapitalista Un anarcho-capitaliste anti-capitalisme Um anticapitalismo anarcocapitalista Ein antikapitalistischer anarcho-kapitalist An apolitical approach to libertarianism Un enfoque apolítico del libertarismo Une approche apolitique du libertarianisme Uma abordagem apolítica do libertarianismo Eine unpolitische herangehensweise an den libertarismus An experiment Un experimento Une expérience Um experimento Ein experiment An individualist formulation of collectivist property Una formulación individualista de la propiedad colectivista Une formulation individualiste de la propriété collectiviste Uma formulação individualista da propriedade coletivista Eine individualistische formulierung von kollektivistischem eigentum Anarchism and atheism, theism and statism La verdadera historia de la ética Anarchisme et athéisme, théisme et étatisme Anarquismo e ateísmo, teísmo e estatismo Anarchismus und atheismus, theismus und statismus Anarchism as scepticism El anarquismo como escepticismo L’anarchisme comme scepticisme Anarquismo como ceticismo Anarchismus als skepsis Anarchy and the problem of the commons La anarquía y el problema de los bienes comunes L’anarchie et le problème des communs Anarquia e o problema dos bens comuns Anarchie und das problem der commons Anatomy of the state Anatomia del estado Anatomie de l’état Anatomia do estado Anatomie des staates Animator Animator Animator Animator Animator Anthem Himno Hymne Hino Hymne Anyone for war? ¿Alguien para la guerra? Quelqu’un pour la guerre? Alguém para a guerra? Jemand für den krieg? Are anarchists pacifists? ¿Son los anarquistas pacifistas? Les anarchistes sont-ils pacifistes? Os anarquistas são pacifistas? Sind anarchisten pazifisten? Are anarcho-capitalists anti-war? ¿Son los anarcocapitalistas contra la guerra? Les anarcho-capitalistes sont-ils anti-guerre? Os anarcocapitalistas são anti-guerra? Sind anarcho-kapitalistische antikriegsführer? Are there different types of anarcho-capitalism? ¿Existen diferentes tipos de anarcocapitalismo? Existe-t-il différents types d'anarcho-capitalisme? Existem diferentes tipos de anarco-capitalismo? Gibt es verschiedene arten von anarcho-kapitalismus? Aren’t anarchists terrorists? ¿No son los anarquistas terroristas? Les anarchistes ne sont-ils pas des terroristes? Não são anarquistas terroristas? Sind anarchisten keine terroristen? Battleships and schools Acorazados y escuelas Cuirassés et écoles Battleships e escolas Schlachtschiffe und schulen Beyond patriarchy: A libertarian model of the family Más allá del patriarcado: Un modelo libertario de la familia Au-delà du patriarcat: Un modèle libertaire de la famille Além do patriarcado: Um modelo libertário da família Jenseits des patriarchats: Ein libertäres modell der familie Beyond the boss: Protection from business in a free nation Más allá del jefe: Protección de los negocios en una nación libre Au-delà du patron: Protection contre les affaires dans une nation libre Além do chefe: Proteção dos negócios em uma nação livre Jenseits des chefs: Schutz vor geschäften in einer freien nation Books Books Books Books Books Boot Boot Boot Boot Boot Borders Fronteras Les frontières Fronteiras Grenzen Bubblegum money Dinero de chicle Argent bubblegum Dinheiro bubblegum Bubblegum geld Bumblebee Bumblebee Bumblebee Bumblebee Bumblebee But that would be anarchy! ¡Pero eso sería anarquía! Mais ce serait l’anarchie! Mas isso seria anarquia! Aber das wäre anarchie! Caging the beasts Enjaulando a las bestias Mise en cage des bêtes Enjaulando os animais Käfig die bestien Calculator Calculator Calculator Calculator Calculator Calendars Calendars Calendars Calendars Calendars Camera Camera Camera Camera Camera Can anarcho-capitalism work? ¿Puede funcionar el anarcocapitalismo? L'anarcho-capitalisme peut-il fonctionner? O anarco-capitalismo pode funcionar? Kann anarcho-kapitalismus funktionieren? Can voluntaryism fix the machine? ¿Puede el voluntariado arreglar la máquina? Le volontariat peut-il réparer la machine? O voluntariado pode consertar a máquina? Kann freiwilligkeit die maschine reparieren? Capitalism Capitalismo Capitalisme Capitalismo Kapitalismus Capitalism and the environment Capitalismo y medio ambiente Le capitalisme et l’environnement Capitalismo e meio ambiente Kapitalismus und umwelt Capitalism versus statism Capitalismo versus estatismo Capitalisme contre étatisme Capitalismo versus estatismo Kapitalismus versus statismus Captain Davies and Private Slovik Capitán Davies y Soldado Slovik Capitaine Davies et Soldat Slovik Capitão Davies e Soldado Particular Slovik Kapitän Davies und Private Slovik Checks and balances: Two kinds Verificaciones y saldos: Dos tipos Contrôles et soldes: Deux types Cheques e saldos: Dois tipos Checks and balances: Zwei arten Children Niños Les enfants Crianças Kinder Children and the family Los niños y la familia Les enfants et la famille Crianças e família Kinder und die familie Christopher Hitchens on evidence Christopher Hitchens en evidencia Christopher Hitchens en preuve Christopher Hitchens em evidência Christopher Hitchens über beweise Code Code Code Code Code Communication Communication Communication Communication Communication Competition and cooperation Competencia y cooperación Concurrence et coopération Concorrência e cooperação Wettbewerb und zusammenarbeit Controls Controls Controls Controls Controls Counter the state Contrarrestar el estado Contre l’état Contador do estado Gegen den staat Coverage but not care Cobertura pero no importa Couverture mais pas attention Cobertura, mas não me importo Abdeckung, aber egal Creativity Creatividad La créativité Criatividade Kreativität Day of infamy: July 26, 1941 Día de la infamia: 26 de Julio de 1941 Jour d’infamie: 26 Juillet 1941 Dia da infâmia: 26 de Julho de 1941 Tag der schande: 26 Juli 1941 Define your terms: Capitalism Define tus términos: Capitalismo Définissez vos termes: Capitalisme Defina seus termos: Capitalismo Definieren sie Ihre begriffe: Kapitalismus Define your terms: Corporatism Define tus términos: Corporativismo Définissez vos termes: Corporatisme Defina seus termos: Corporativismo Definieren sie Ihre begriffe: Korporatismus Define your terms: State Define tus términos: Estado Définissez vos termes: Etat Defina seus termos: Estado Definieren sie Ihre begriffe: Staat Define your terms: Statism Define tus términos: Estatismo Définissez vos termes: Statisme Defina seus termos: Statism Definieren sie Ihre begriffe: Statismus Define your terms: Voluntaryism Define tus términos: Voluntariado Définissez vos termes: Volontariat Defina seus termos: Voluntariado Definieren sie Ihre begriffe: Freiwilligkeit Democracy is impossible La democracia es imposible La démocratie est impossible Democracia é impossível Demokratie ist unmöglich Democracy is slavery La democracia es esclavitud La démocratie est l’esclavage Democracia é escravidão Demokratie ist sklaverei Deplatforming is not censorship Derribar las plataformas no es censura Déplatformer n’est pas de la censure Deplantar não é censura Deplatforming ist keine zensur Dictionary Dictionary Dictionary Dictionary Dictionary Discs Discs Discs Discs Discs Disproving the state Refutando el estado La réfutation de l’état Desprovando o estado Den staat widerlegen Do anarcho-capitalists favour chaos? ¿Los anarcocapitalistas favorecen el caos? Les anarcho-capitalistes favorisent-ils le chaos? Os anarco-capitalistas favorecem o caos? Bevorzugen anarcho-kapitalisten das chaos? Dock Dock Dock Dock Dock Does money inspire us to cooperate? ¿El dinero nos inspira a cooperar? L’argent nous inspire-t-il à coopérer? O dinheiro nos inspira a cooperar? Inspiriert uns geld zur zusammenarbeit? Does spanking violate the non-aggression principle? ¿Las nalgadas violan el principio de no agresión? La fessée viole-t-elle le principe de non-agression? A surra viola o princípio da não agressão? Verstößt spanking gegen das nichtangriffsprinzip? Don’t anarchists assume that all people are innately virtuous? ¿No asumen los anarquistas que todas las personas son virtuosas por naturaleza? Les anarchistes ne supposent-ils pas que tout le monde est naturellement vertueux? Os anarquistas não presumem que todas as pessoas são virtuosas por natureza? Gehen anarchisten nicht davon aus, dass alle menschen von natur aus tugendhaft sind? Don’t anarchists favour chaos? ¿No favorecen los anarquistas el caos? Les anarchistes ne sont-ils pas favorables au chaos? Os anarquistas não favorecem o caos? Bevorzugen anarchisten kein chaos? Don’t anarchists favour the abolition of the family, property, religion, and other social institutions besides the state? ¿No favorecen los anarquistas la abolición de la familia, la propiedad, la religión y otras instituciones sociales además del estado? Les anarchistes ne sont-ils pas favorables à l’abolition de la famille, de la propriété, de la religion et d’autres institutions sociales en plus de l’État? Os anarquistas não favorecem a abolição da família, propriedade, religião e outras instituições sociais além do estado? Befürworten anarchisten nicht die abschaffung der familie, des eigentums, der religion und anderer sozialer Institutionen neben dem staat? Economics Económicas Économie Economia Wirtschaft Education Educación Éducation Educação Bildung Education in colonial America Educación en la América colonial L’éducation en Amérique coloniale Educação na América colonial Bildung im kolonialen Amerika Eight dangerous myths about spanking Ocho mitos peligrosos sobre las nalgadas Huit mythes dangereux sur la fessée Oito mitos perigosos sobre surras Acht gefährliche mythen über prügel Encyclopaedia Encyclopaedia Encyclopaedia Encyclopaedia Encyclopaedia Environment Medio ambiente Environnement Meio Ambiente Umgebung Ethics Ética Éthique Ética Ethik Ethics, human nature, and government Ética, naturaleza humana, y gobierno. Éthique, nature humaine, et gouvernement Ética, natureza humana, e governo Ethik, menschliche natur, und regierung Existence, logic, evidence, and truth Existencia, lógica, evidencia y verdad Existence, logique, évidence et vérité Existência, lógica, evidência e verdade Existenz, logik, beweise und wahrheit Family Familia Famille Família Familie Files Files Files Files Files Film Editor Film Editor Film Editor Film Editor Film Editor Fonts Fonts Fonts Fonts Fonts Forget the argument from efficiency Olvida el argumento de la eficiencia Oubliez l’argument de l’efficacité Esqueça o argumento da eficiência Vergessen sie das argument der effizienz Free association Asociación libre Association libre Associação livre Freie vereinigung Free body Cuerpo libre Corps libre Corpo livre Freier körper Free enterprise and health care Libre empresa y asistencia sanitaria Libre entreprise et soins de santé Livre iniciativa e saúde Freies unternehmertum und gesundheitsversorgung Free families to statist societies and back again Familias gratuitas a sociedades estatistas y viceversa Libérer les familles des sociétés d’état et inversement Famílias livres para sociedades estatistas e vice-versa Freie familien zu statistischen gesellschaften und wieder zurück Free markets and monopoly Mercados libres y monopolio Marchés libres et monopole Mercados livres e monopólio Freie märkte und monopol Free markets are regulated Los mercados libres están regulados Les marchés libres sont réglementés Os mercados livres são regulamentados Freie märkte sind reguliert Free mind Mente libre Esprit libre Mente livre Freigeist Free trade Libre comercio Libre échange Livre comércio Freihandel Freedom on a leash Libertad con correa Liberté en laisse Liberdade na coleira Freiheit an der leine Freedom to chose your own money Libertad para elegir tu propio dinero Liberté de choisir son propre argent Liberdade para escolher seu próprio dinheiro Freiheit dein eigenes geld zu wählen Freedom, liberty, peace, happiness, and prosperity Libertad, libertad, paz, felicidad y prosperidad Liberté, liberté, paix, bonheur et prospérité Liberdade, liberdade, paz, felicidade e prosperidade Freiheit, freiheit, frieden, glück und wohlstand Freedom, reason, and cults Libertad, razón y cultos Liberté, raison et cultes Liberdade, razão e cultos Freiheit, vernunft und kulte Frequently asked questions Preguntas frecuentes Questions fréquemment posées Perguntas frequentes Häufig gestellte fragen Funding public goods: Six solutions Financiación de bienes públicos: Seis soluciones Financement des biens publics: Six solutions Financiamento de bens públicos: Seis soluções Finanzierung öffentlicher güter: Sechs lösungen Government Gobierno Gouvernement Governo Regierung Government as rape Gobierno como violación Le gouvernement comme viol Governo como estupro Regierung als vergewaltigung Government control of immigration: Is it a violation of individual sovereignty? Control gubernamental de la inmigración: ¿es una violación de la soberanía individual? Contrôle gouvernemental de l’immigration: est-ce une violation de la souveraineté individuelle? Controle governamental da imigração: É uma violação da soberania individual? Kontrolle der einwanderung durch die regierung: Handelt es sich um eine verletzung der individuellen souveränität? Government is force El gobierno es fuerza Le gouvernement est la force Governo é força Regierung ist kraft Government makes healthcare worse and more expensive El gobierno empeora la atención médica y la encarece Le gouvernement rend les soins de santé pires et plus chers Governo torna a saúde pior e mais cara Die regierung macht die gesundheitsversorgung schlechter und teurer Green rising: The dangers of political environmentalism Levantamiento verde: Los peligros del ambientalismo político Levée verte: Les dangers de l’environnementalisme politique Crescimento verde: Os perigos do ambientalismo político Grüner aufstieg: Die gefahren des politischen umweltschutzes Guns prevent thousands of crimes every day Las armas previenen miles de delitos todos los días Les armes à feu empêchent des milliers de crimes chaque jour As armas evitam milhares de crimes todos os dias Waffen verhindern jeden tag tausende von verbrechen Hard money in the voluntaryist tradition Dinero duro en la tradición voluntarista De l’argent dur dans la tradition du volontariat Dinheiro duro na tradição voluntária Hartes geld in der freiwilligen tradition Have there been any anarcho-capitalist societies? ¿Ha habido sociedades anarcocapitalistas? Y a-t-il eu des sociétés anarcho-capitalistes? Houve alguma sociedade anarco-capitalista? Gab es anarcho-kapitalistische gesellschaften? Have there been any historical examples of anarchist societies? ¿Ha habido ejemplos históricos de sociedades anarquistas? Y a-t-il eu des exemples historiques de sociétés anarchistes? Houve algum exemplo histórico de sociedades anarquistas? Gab es historische beispiele für anarchistische gesellschaften? Health Salud Santé Saúde Gesundheit Health care: An anarchist approach Cuidado de la salud: Un enfoque anarquista Soins de santé: Une approche anarchiste Cuidados de saúde: Uma abordagem anarquista Gesundheitsversorgung: Ein anarchistischer ansatz Healthcare is a right? La asistencia sanitaria es un derecho? La santé est un droit? Saúde é um direito? Gesundheitswesen ist ein recht? Home Home Home Home Home Home is best El hogar es lo mejor La maison est la meilleure Lar é o melhor Zuhause ist am besten How can governments be abolished? ¿Cómo se pueden abolir los gobiernos? Comment les gouvernements peuvent-ils être abolis? Como os governos podem ser abolidos? Wie können regierungen abgeschafft werden? How do anarcho-capitalists compare with other anarchists? ¿Cómo se comparan los anarcocapitalistas con otros anarquistas? Comment les anarcho-capitalistes se comparent-ils aux autres anarchistes? Como os anarco-capitalistas se comparam a outros anarquistas? Wie vergleichen sich anarcho-kapitalisten mit anderen anarchisten? How environmentalism disdains the poor Cómo el ambientalismo desdeña a los pobres Comment l’environnementalisme méprise les pauvres Como o ambientalismo desdenha os pobres Wie umweltschutz die armen verachtet How free is the “free market”? ¿Qué tan libre es el “mercado libre”? Le “marché libre” est-il gratuit? Quão livre é o “mercado livre”? Wie frei ist der “freie Markt”? How government solved the health care crisis Cómo el gobierno resolvió la crisis de salud Comment le gouvernement a résolu la crise des soins de santé Como o governo resolveu a crise da saúde Wie die regierung die gesundheitskrise gelöst hat How might an anarchist society be achieved? ¿Cómo se puede lograr una sociedad anarquista? Comment une société anarchiste pourrait-elle être réalisée? Como uma sociedade anarquista pode ser alcançada? Wie könnte eine anarchistische gesellschaft erreicht werden? How might an anarcho-capitalist society be achieved? ¿Cómo se puede lograr una sociedad anarcocapitalista? Comment parvenir à une société anarcho-capitaliste? Como uma sociedade anarco-capitalista pode ser alcançada? Wie könnte eine anarcho-kapitalistische gesellschaft erreicht werden? How the free market works Cómo funciona el mercado libre Comment fonctionne le marché libre Como funciona o mercado livre Wie der freie markt funktioniert How the state destroys social cooperation Cómo el estado destruye la cooperación social Comment l’état détruit la coopération sociale Como o Estado destrói a cooperação social Wie der staat die soziale zusammenarbeit zerstört How the state thrives, how the state fails Cómo prospera el estado, cómo falla el estado Comment l’état prospère, comment l’état échoue Como o estado prospera, como o estado falha Wie der staat gedeiht, wie der staat versagt How to establish a government Cómo establecer un gobierno Comment établir un gouvernement Como estabelecer um governo Wie man eine regierung gründet How to prevent violent criminal behaviour in the next generation Cómo prevenir el comportamiento criminal violento en la próxima generación Comment prévenir les comportements criminels violents dans la prochaine génération Como evitar comportamentos criminosos violentos na próxima geração Wie man gewalttätiges kriminelles verhalten in der nächsten generation verhindert How would anarchists handle the public goods problem? ¿Cómo manejarían los anarquistas el problema de los bienes públicos? Comment les anarchistes géreraient-ils le problème des biens publics? Como os anarquistas lidariam com o problema dos bens públicos? Wie würden anarchisten mit dem problem der öffentlichen güter umgehen? How would anarcho-capitalism work? ¿Cómo funcionaría el anarcocapitalismo? Comment fonctionnerait le capitalisme anarcho? Como funcionaria o anarco capitalismo? Wie würde der anarchokapitalismus funktionieren? How would anarcho-capitalists handle the public goods problem? ¿Cómo manejarían los anarcocapitalistas el problema de los bienes públicos? Comment les anarcho-capitalistes traiteraient-ils le problème des biens publics? Como os anarco-capitalistas lidariam com o problema dos bens públicos? Wie würden anarcho-kapitalisten mit dem problem der öffentlichen güter umgehen? How would left anarchy work? ¿Cómo funcionaría la anarquía de izquierda? Comment fonctionnerait l'anarchie de gauche? Como a anarquia de esquerda funcionaria? Wie würde die anarchie funktionieren? Human nature La naturaleza humana Nature humaine Natureza humana Menschliche natur i suport publick skools apoyo a publick skools je soutiens les écoles publick eu apoio skools publick ich unterstütze publick skools I, Pencil Yo, Lápiz Moi, Crayon Eu Lápis Ich, Bleistift Ignorance of the law is an excuse La ignorancia de la ley es una excusa L’ignorance de la loi est une excuse A ignorância da lei é uma desculpa Unwissenheit über das gesetz ist eine entschuldigung Immigration controls are socialist Los controles de inmigración son socialistas Les contrôles de l’immigration sont socialistes Os controles de imigração são socialistas Einwanderungskontrollen sind sozialistisch Immigration: Anarchy worked Inmigración: La anarquía funcionó Immigration: L’anarchie a fonctionné Imigração: Anarquia trabalhou Einwanderung: Anarchie hat funktioniert Importing freedom Importando libertad Importer la liberté Importando liberdade Freiheit importieren In defence of anarchism En defensa del anarquismo Pour la défense de l’anarchisme Em defesa do anarquismo Zur verteidigung des anarchismus In defence of organ-legging En defensa de las piernas de órganos En défense du legging d’orgue Em defesa da legging de órgãos Zur verteidigung von organbeinen In search of the super villain En busca del super villano À la recherche du super méchant Em busca do super vilão Auf der suche nach dem superschurken Individual liberty Libertad individual Liberté individuelle Liberdade individual Individuelle freiheit Intellectual property without legislation Propiedad intelectual sin legislación Propriété intellectuelle sans législation Propriedade intelectual sem legislação Geistiges eigentum ohne gesetzgebung Interventionism Intervencionismo Interventionnisme Intervencionismo Interventionismus Is anarchism the same thing as libertarianism? ¿Es el anarquismo lo mismo que el libertarismo? L’anarchisme est-il la même chose que le libertarisme? Anarquismo é a mesma coisa que libertarianismo? Ist anarchismus dasselbe wie libertarismus? Is anarchism the same thing as socialism? ¿Es el anarquismo lo mismo que el socialismo? L’anarchisme est-il la même chose que le socialisme? Anarquismo é a mesma coisa que socialismo? Ist anarchismus dasselbe wie sozialismus? Is anarcho-capitalism the same thing as libertarianism? ¿Es el anarcocapitalismo lo mismo que el libertarismo? L'anarcho-capitalisme est-il la même chose que le libertarisme? Anarco-capitalismo é a mesma coisa que libertarianismo? Ist anarchokapitalismus dasselbe wie libertarismus? Is anarcho-capitalism utopian? ¿Es utópico el anarcocapitalismo? L’anarcho-capitalisme est-il utopique? O anarco-capitalismo é utópico? Ist der Anarcho-Kapitalismus utopisch? Is evil necessary? ¿Es necesario el mal? Le mal est-il nécessaire? O mal é necessário? Ist das böse notwendig? Is health care a human right? Es el cuidado de la salud un derecho humano? Les soins de santé sont-ils un droit humain? A saúde é um direito humano? Ist die gesundheitsversorgung ein menschenrecht? Is laissez faire capitalism exploitative? ¿El capitalismo de laissez faire es explotador? Le capitalisme du laissez-faire est-il exploiteur? O capitalismo do laissez faire é explorador? Ist der laissez-faire-kapitalismus ausbeuterisch? Is voting an act of violence? ¿Es votar un acto de violencia? Le vote est-il un acte de violence? O voto é um ato de violência? Ist das wählen ein akt der gewalt? Isn’t anarchism utopian? ¿No es utópico el anarquismo? L’anarchisme n’est-il pas utopique? O anarquismo não é utópico? Ist der anarchismus nicht utopisch? Judeo-Christian morality versus the free society La moral Judeocristiana frente a la sociedad libre Moralidade Judaico-Cristã versus sociedade livre Moralidade Judaico-Cristã versus sociedade livre Jüdisch-Christliche moral gegen die freie gesellschaft Justice Justicia Justice Justiça Gerechtigkeit Keep calm and forever libertarian Mantén la calma y por siempre libertario Restez calme et libertaire pour toujours Mantenha a calma e sempre libertário Bleib ruhig und für immer libertär Kill private capital, kill civilisation Mata capital privado, mata civilización Tuez des capitaux privés, tuez la civilisation Matar capital privado, matar civilização Töte privates kapital, töte die zivilisation Knockout Knockout Knockout Knockout Knockout Law enforcement socialism Socialismo de aplicación de la ley Socialisme répressif Socialismo policial Strafverfolgungssozialismus Law, property rights, and air pollution Ley, derechos de propiedad y contaminación del aire Loi, droits de propriété et pollution atmosphérique Lei, direitos de propriedade e poluição do ar Recht, eigentumsrechte und luftverschmutzung Libertarian anarchism: Responses to ten objections Anarquismo libertario: Respuestas a diez objeciones Anarchisme libertaire: Réponses à dix objections Anarquismo libertário: Respostas a dez objeções Libertärer anarchismus: Antworten auf zehn einwände Liberty as a lack of unchosen positive obligations La libertad como falta de obligaciones positivas no elegidas La liberté comme un manque d’obligations positives non choisies Liberdade como falta de obrigações positivas não escolhidas Freiheit als mangel an nicht gewählten positiven verpflichtungen Liberty for all means immigrants too Libertad para todos significa inmigrantes también La liberté pour tous signifie aussi l’immigration Liberdade para todos os meios também imigrantes Freiheit für alle bedeutet auch einwanderer Limited government Gobierno limitado Gouvernement limité Governo limitado Begrenzte regierung Limited government — A moral issue? Gobierno limitado: ¿Un problema moral? Un gouvernement limité — Une question morale? Governo limitado — Uma questão moral? Begrenzte Regierung — Eine moralische frage? Login Login Login Login Login Man, family, and state Hombre, familia y estado Homme, famille et état Homem, família e estado Mann, familie und staat Maps Maps Maps Maps Maps Market Mercado Marché Mercado Markt Market anarchism versus market statism Anarquismo de mercado versus estatismo de mercado L’anarchisme de marché contre l’étatisme de marché Anarquismo de mercado versus estatismo de mercado Marktanarchismus versus marktstatismus Market prices — Purpose versus arbitrariness Precios de mercado — Propósito versus arbitrariedad Prix du marché — But contre arbitraire Preços de mercado — Finalidade versus arbitrariedade Marktpreise — Zweck versus willkür Markets and freedom Mercados y libertad Marchés et liberté Mercados e liberdade Märkte und freiheit Marx as utopian Marx como utópico Marx comme utopiste Marx como utópico Marx als utopist Messages Messages Messages Messages Messages Meth and other drug war facts Metanfetamina y otros hechos de la guerra contra las drogas Meth et autres faits sur la guerre contre la drogue Metanfetamina e outros fatos da guerra às drogas Meth und andere fakten zum drogenkrieg Minarchism Minarquismo Minarchisme Minarquismo Minarchismus Minarchism versus anarchism Minarquismo versus anarquismo Minarchisme contre anarchisme Minarquismo versus anarquismo Minarchismus gegen anarchismus Minarchism: Ethically self-contradictory Minarquismo: Éticamente autocontradictorio Minarchisme: Éthiquement contradictoire Minarquismo: Éticamente auto-contraditório Minarchismus: Ethisch widersprüchlich Money Dinero Argent Dinheiro Geld Multimedia Multimedia Multimédia Multimídia Multimedia Music Music Music Music Music Natural law La Ley natural Loi naturelle Lei natural Naturgesetz Neither tax nor punishment Ni impuestos ni castigos Ni impôt ni punition Nem imposto nem punição Weder steuern noch strafen New Zealand’s path to prosperity began with rejecting democratic socialism El camino de Nueva Zelanda hacia la prosperidad comenzó con el rechazo del socialismo democrático La voie de la prospérité de la Nouvelle-Zélande a commencé par le rejet du socialisme démocratique O caminho da Nova Zelândia para a prosperidade começou com a rejeição do socialismo democrático Neuseelands weg zum wohlstand begann mit der ablehnung des demokratischen sozialismus News News News News News No rulers Sin gobernantes Pas de dirigeants Sem réguas Keine herrscher No treason: The constitution of no authority Sin traición: La constitución de ninguna autoridad Pas de trahison: La constitution d’aucune autorité Sem traição: A constituição de nenhuma autoridade Kein verrat: Die verfassung ohne autorität Notes Notes Notes Notes Notes Notifications Notifications Notifications Notifications Notifications Objective morality Moralidad objetiva Moralité objective Moralidade objetiva Objektive moral Objects are morally neutral Los objetos son moralmente neutros Les objets sont moralement neutres Objetos são moralmente neutros Objekte sind moralisch neutral On human nature Sobre la naturaleza humana Sur la nature humaine Sobre a natureza humana Über die menschliche natur On overcoming scarcity Sobre la superación de la escasez Surmonter la pénurie Superando a escassez Über die überwindung der knappheit On slavery in a free market Sobre la esclavitud en un mercado libre Sur l’esclavage dans un marché libre Sobre a escravidão em um mercado livre Über die sklaverei in einem freien markt On the meaning of voting Sobre el significado de votar Sur le sens du vote Sobre o significado da votação Über die bedeutung der abstimmung On the need for a final arbiter Sobre la necesidad de un árbitro final Sur la nécessité d'un arbitre final Sobre a necessidade de um árbitro final Über die notwendigkeit eines endgültigen schiedsrichters On the rule of law Sobre el estado de derecho Sur l’état de droit Sobre o estado de direito Rechtsstaatlichkeit On voting En la votación Sur le vote Na votação Bei der abstimmung Only cowards vote Solo los cobardes votan Seuls les lâches votent Somente covardes votam Nur feiglinge stimmen ab Open borders or no borders? ¿Fronteras abiertas o sin fronteras? Frontières ouvertes ou pas de frontières? Fronteiras abertas ou sem fronteiras? Offene grenzen oder keine grenzen? Ownership of the product by capitalists Propiedad del producto por los capitalistas Propriété du produit par les capitalistes Propriedade do produto pelos capitalistas Eigentum des produkts durch kapitalisten Pages Pages Pages Pages Pages Parents can trust kids to teach themselves Los padres pueden confiar en que los niños se enseñarán por sí mismos Les parents peuvent faire confiance aux enfants pour qu’ils apprennent eux-mêmes Os pais podem confiar que os filhos aprenderão a si mesmos Eltern können darauf vertrauen, dass kinder sich selbst unterrichten Phone Phone Phone Phone Phone Photos Photos Photos Photos Photos Pixelater Pixelater Pixelater Pixelater Pixelater Plain talk about spanking Hablar claro de azotes Parler clairement de la fessée Discussão simples sobre palmada Einfach über spanking reden Podcasts Podcasts Podcasts Podcasts Podcasts Politics is the opiate of the masses La política es el opio de las masas La politique est l’opium des masses A política é o ópio das massas Politik ist das opiat der massen Positive “rights” “Derechos” positivos Des “droits” positifs “Direitos” positivos Positive “rechte” Power Poder Puissance Poder Leistung Pragmatic utilitarianism: A road to tyranny Utilitarismo pragmático: Un camino hacia la tiranía Utilitarisme pragmatique: Un chemin vers la tyrannie Utilitarismo pragmático: Um caminho para a tirania Pragmatischer utilitarismus: Ein weg zur tyrannei Principles, freedom, and you Principios, libertad y tu Principes, liberté et vous Princípios, liberdade e você Prinzipien, freiheit und du Private charity versus “public welfare” Caridad privada versus “bienestar público” Charité privée contre “bien-être public” Caridade privada versus “bem-estar público” Private Wohltätigkeit versus “Gemeinwohl” Private defence Defensa privada Défense privée Defesa privada Private verteidigung Private law Derecho privado Loi privée Lei privada Privatrecht Private property or possession: A synthesis Propiedad o posesión privada: Una síntesis Propriété ou possession privée: Une synthèse Propriedade ou posse privada: Uma síntese Privateigentum oder besitz: Eine synthese Productivity Productividad Productivité Produtividade Produktivität Publisher Publisher Publisher Publisher Publisher Punishment versus restitution: A formulation Castigo versus restitución: Una formulación Punition contre restitution: Une formulation Punição versus restituição: Uma formulação Bestrafung versus wiedergutmachung: Eine formulierung Pursuing justice in a free society Persiguiendo la justicia en una sociedad libre Poursuivre la justice dans une société libre Buscar a justiça em uma sociedade livre Streben nach gerechtigkeit in einer freien gesellschaft Religion Religión Religion Religião Religion Religion Religión Religion Religião Religion Reminders Reminders Reminders Reminders Reminders Resist injustice Resistir la injusticia Résister à l'injustice Resistir à injustiça Widerstehen sie der ungerechtigkeit Resist untruth Resistir la mentira Résister au mensonge Resista à mentira Widerstehen sie der unwahrheit The state: A review El estado: Una revisión L’état: Un bilan O estado: Uma revisão Der staat: Eine überprüfung Review: Universally Preferable Behaviour Revisión: Comportamiento Universalmente Preferible Révision: Comportement Universellement Préférable Revisão: Comportamento Universalmente Preferível Rückblick: Allgemein Bevorzugtes Verhalten Ricky Gervais on offence Ricky Gervais en ataque Ricky Gervais en attaque Ricky Gervais no ataque Ricky Gervais in der offensive Right, wrong, and the difference Bien, mal y la diferencia Bien, mal et la différence Certo, errado e a diferença Richtig, falsch und der unterschied Rights Derechos Droits Direitos Rechte Roads to serfdom Caminos a la servidumbre Les routes du servage Estradas para a servidão Wege zur leibeigenschaft Schools are outdated, it is time for reform Las escuelas están desactualizadas, es hora de una reforma Les écoles sont dépassées, il est temps de se réformer As escolas estão desatualizadas, é hora de reforma Schulen sind veraltet, es ist zeit für reformen Secular deities and the problem of humanism Deidades seculares y el problema del humanismo Divinités laïques et problème de l’humanisme Deidades seculares e o problema do humanismo Weltliche gottheiten und das problem des humanismus Self-ownership Propiedad propia Propriété de soi Propriedade própria Eigenverantwortung Settings Settings Settings Settings Settings Sheets Sheets Sheets Sheets Sheets Shell Cáscara Coquille Concha Schale Six lessons on the history and economics of taxation Seis lecciones sobre la historia y la economía de los impuestos Six leçons sur l’histoire et l’économie de la fiscalité Seis lições sobre história e economia da tributação Sechs lektionen zur geschichte und ökonomie der besteuerung Slavery contracts and inalienable rights: A formulation Contratos de esclavitud y derechos inalienables: Una formulación Contrats d’esclavage et droits inaliénables: Une formulation Contratos de escravidão e direitos inalienáveis: Uma formulação Sklaverei-verträge und unveräußerliche rechte: Eine formulierung Slides Slides Slides Slides Slides Smokescreen Smokescreen Smokescreen Smokescreen Smokescreen Social Social Social Social Social Social justice philosophy is a blank cheque for government power La filosofía de la justicia social es un cheque en blanco para el poder del gobierno La philosophie de justice sociale est un chèque en blanc pour le pouvoir gouvernemental A filosofia da justiça social é um cheque em branco para o poder do governo Die philosophie der sozialen gerechtigkeit ist ein blankoscheck für die macht der regierung Socialism of the right Socialismo de la derecha Socialisme de droite Socialismo de direita Sozialismus der rechten Society in jail Sociedad en la carcel Société en prison Sociedade na cadeia Gesellschaft im gefängnis Society without a state Sociedad sin estado Société sans état Sociedade sem estado Gesellschaft ohne staat Some mistakes of Moses Algunos errores de Moisés Quelques erreurs de Moïse Alguns erros de Moisés Einige fehler von Moses Sound Editor Sound Editor Sound Editor Sound Editor Sound Editor Stability and the free market Estabilidad y libre mercado Stabilité et marché libre Estabilidade e o mercado livre Stabilität und der freie markt Stateless dictatorships: How a free society prevents the re-emergence of a government Dictaduras sin estado: Cómo una sociedad libre evita el resurgimiento de un gobierno Dictatures apatrides: Comment une société libre empêche la réémergence d’un gouvernement Ditaduras apátridas: Como uma sociedade livre impede o ressurgimento de um governo Staatenlose diktaturen: Wie eine freie gesellschaft das wiederauftauchen einer regierung verhindert Stateless not lawless: Voluntaryism and arbitration Apátridas no sin ley: Voluntariado y arbitraje Apatrides pas sans loi: Volontariat et arbitrage Apátrida, não ilegal: Voluntariado e arbitragem Staatenlos nicht gesetzlos: Freiwilligkeit und schiedsgerichtsbarkeit Statist reasoning: Non-freedom for non-voters Razonamiento estadístico: No libertad para los no votantes Raisonnement étatique: Non-liberté pour les non-votants Raciocínio estatista: Não-liberdade para não-eleitores Statistische argumentation: Nichtfreiheit für nichtwähler Statist reasoning: Not me, but everybody else Razonamiento estadístico: No yo, sino todos los demás Raisonnement étatiste: Pas moi, mais tout le monde Raciocínio estatista: Não eu, mas todo mundo Statistische argumentation: Nicht ich, sondern alle anderen Stay positive Mantente positivo Reste positif Se mantenha positivo Bleib positiv Store Store Store Store Store Strong atheism Fuerte ateísmo Athéisme fort Ateísmo forte Starker atheismus Switch Switch Switch Switch Switch Symptoms of government meddling in health care Síntomas de intromisión del gobierno en la atención médica Symptômes d’ingérence du gouvernement dans les soins de santé Sintomas de intromissão do governo nos cuidados de saúde Symptome einer einmischung der regierung in die gesundheitsversorgung Tangled as political allegory Enredado como alegoría política Emmêlé comme allégorie politique Emaranhado como alegoria política Wirren als politische allegorie Tax is theft! Imposto é roubo! La taxe, c’est du vol! Imposto é roubo! Steuer ist diebstahl! Taxation Impuestos Imposition Imposto Besteuerung Taxation is robbery Los impuestos son robos La fiscalité est un vol Tributação é roubo Besteuerung ist raub Taxation is the lifeblood of the state Los impuestos son el elemento vital del estado La fiscalité est la pierre angulaire de l’état A tributação é a força vital do estado Steuern sind das lebenselixier des staates Taxation: Call it what it is Impuestos: llámalo como es Fiscalité: Appelez ça comme c’est Tributação: Chame do que é Besteuerung: Nennen sie es wie es ist Terminal Terminal Terminal Terminal Terminal Terrorists at the gate Terroristas en la puerta Terroristes à la porte Terroristas no portão Terroristen am tor Test Prueba Test Teste Prüfung The age of the suitcase nuke La edad de la maleta nuclear L’âge de la valise nuke A idade das armas nucleares da mala Das Alter der koffernuke The anarchism and minarchism blur El anarquismo y el minarquismo se difuminan L’anarchisme et le minarchisme se brouillent O anarquismo e o minarquismo se confundem Der anarchismus und der minarchismus verschwimmen The argument from morality El argumento de la moral L’argument de la morale O argumento da moralidade Das argument der moral The case for free immigration, the case against borders El caso de la inmigración libre, el caso contra las fronteras Les arguments en faveur d’une immigration libre, les arguments contre les frontières O caso da imigração livre, o caso contra as fronteiras Der fall für freie einwanderung, der fall gegen grenzen The crackdown on ‘price gouging’ helps no one, except politicians and the media La represión de la ‘subida de precios’ no ayuda a nadie, excepto a los políticos y los medios de comunicación La répression des ‘prix abusifs’ n’aide personne, sauf les politiciens et les médias A repressão à ‘manipulação de preços’ não ajuda ninguém, exceto políticos e a mídia Das vorgehen gegen ‘Preissenkungen’ hilft niemandem auber politikern und medien The decline and fall of private law in Iceland El declive y la caída del derecho privado en Islandia Le déclin et la chute du droit privé en Islande O declínio e queda do direito privado na Islândia Der niedergang und fall des privatrechts in Island The decline of morality in the west La decadencia de la moral en occidente Le déclin de la moralité à l’ouest O declínio da moralidade no oeste Der niedergang der moral im westen The economic tendency of free thought La tendencia económica del pensamiento libre La tendance économique de la libre pensée A tendência econômica do pensamento livre Die wirtschaftliche tendenz des freien denkens The end of the end-means dichotomy El fin de la dicotomía de los medios del fin La fin de la dichotomie de fin signifie O fim da dicotomia final significa Das ende des endes bedeutet dichotomie The environment’s true friends are libertarians Los verdaderos amigos del medio ambiente son libertarios Les vrais amis de l’environnement sont des libertaires Os verdadeiros amigos do meio ambiente são os libertários Die wahren freunde der umwelt sind libertäre The ethics of voluntaryism La ética del voluntariado L’éthique du volontariat A ética do voluntariado Die ethik des freiwilligendienstes The failure of American public education El fracaso de la educación pública estadounidense L’échec de l’éducation publique Américaine O fracasso da educação pública Americana Das scheitern der Amerikanischen öffentlichen bildung The Fed’s grasping invisible hand La mano invisible de la Reserva Federal La main invisible de la Fed A mão invisível do Fed Die Fed greift nach unsichtbarer hand The fundamentals of voluntaryism Los fundamentos del voluntariado Les fondamentaux du volontariat Os fundamentos do voluntariado Die grundlagen des freiwilligendienstes The gold standard El estándar de oro L’étalon-or O padrão ouro Der goldstandard The great infidels Los grandes infieles Les grands infidèles Os grandes infiéis Die groben ungläubigen The hidden cost of taxation El costo oculto de los impuestos Le coût caché de la fiscalité O custo oculto da tributação Die versteckten steuerkosten The immorality of the state La inmoralidad del estado L’immoralité de l’état A imoralidade do estado Die unmoral des staates The law La ley La loi A lei Das gesetz The libertarian immigration conundrum El enigma de la inmigración libertaria L’énigme de l’immigration libertaire O dilema da imigração libertária Das libertäre einwanderungsproblem The magical trillion dollar coin La moneda mágica de billones de dólares La pièce magique de mille milliards de dollars A moeda mágica de trilhões de dólares Die magische billionen-dollar-münze The meaning of Nagasaki El significado de Nagasaki La signification de Nagasaki O significado de Nagasaki Die bedeutung von Nagasaki The myth of the rule of law El mito del estado de derecho Le mythe de l'état de droit O mito do estado de direito Der mythos der rechtsstaatlichkeit The myth of the social contract El mito del contrato social Le mythe du contrat social O mito do contrato social Der mythos vom gesellschaftsvertrag The myth that Americans were poorly educated before mass government schooling El mito de que los estadounidenses tenían una educación deficiente antes de la escolarización pública masiva Le mythe selon lequel les Américains étaient mal éduqués avant l’école publique de masse O mito de que os americanos eram mal educados antes da escolarização pública em massa Der mythos, dass die Amerikaner vor dem schulbesuch der massenregierung schlecht ausgebildet waren The myth that the polar bear population is declining El mito de que la población de osos polares está disminuyendo Le mythe selon lequel la population d’ours polaires est en déclin O mito de que a população de ursos polares está diminuindo Der mythos, dass die eisbärenpopulation zurückgeht The nature and origin of money La naturaleza y el origen del dinero La nature et l’origine de l’argent A natureza e origem do dinheiro Die art und herkunft des geldes The nature of law La naturaleza de la ley La nature du droit A natureza da lei Die natur des gesetzes The origin of government authority El origen de la autoridad gubernamental L’origine de l’autorité gouvernementale A origem da autoridade governamental Der ursprung der regierungsbehörde The philosophy of atheism La filosofía del ateísmo La philosophie de l’athéisme A filosofia do ateísmo Die philosophie des atheismus The pluralism of liberty El pluralismo de la libertad Le pluralisme de la liberté O pluralismo da liberdade Der pluralismus der freiheit The power in money El poder en el dinero Le pouvoir en argent O poder do dinheiro Die macht im geld The prince El príncipe Le prince O príncipe Der prinz The private justice alternative La alternativa de la justicia privada L’alternative de justice privée A alternativa da justiça privada Die alternative zur privaten justiz The problem of environmental protection El problema de la protección del medio ambiente Le problème de la protection de l’environnement O problema da proteção ambiental Das problem des umweltschutzes The production of security La producción de seguridad La production de sécurité A produção de segurança Die produktion von sicherheit The real curriculum of “public” education El currículum real de la educación “pública” Le véritable curriculum de l’éducation “publique” O currículo real da educação “pública” Der eigentliche lehrplan der “öffentlichen” bildung The rule of law without the state El estado de derecho sin el estado L’état de droit sans l’état O estado de direito sem o estado Rechtsstaatlichkeit ohne staat The sacred green cow La sagrada vaca verde La vache verte sacrée A vaca verde sagrada Die heilige grüne kuh The second question La segunda pregunta La deuxième question A segunda questão Die zweite frage The state El estado L’état O estado Der staat The state cannot protect the environment — markets can El estado no puede proteger el medio ambiente — los mercados pueden L’État ne peut pas protéger l’environnement — les marchés peuvent O estado não pode proteger o meio ambiente — os mercados podem Der staat kann die umwelt nicht schützen — märkte können The state: Human parasite El estado: Parásito humano L’état: Parasite humain O estado: Parasita humano Der staat: Menschlicher parasit The stateless society La sociedad sin estado La société apatride A sociedade apátrida Die staatenlose gesellschaft The stateless society strikes back La sociedad apátrida contraataca La société apatride riposte A sociedade apátrida ataca Die staatenlose gesellschaft schlägt zurück The state’s education monopoly increases prices and destroys choice El monopolio educativo del estado aumenta los precios y destruye las opciones Le monopole de l’état sur l’éducation fait augmenter les prix et détruit le choix O monopólio da educação do estado aumenta os preços e destrói a escolha Das staatliche bildungsmonopol erhöht die preise und zerstört die wahlmöglichkeiten The statist mindset of anarchists La mentalidad estatista de los anarquistas La mentalité étatiste des anarchistes A mentalidade estatista dos anarquistas Die statistische denkweise der anarchisten The stone mover El motor de piedra Le déménageur de pierre O movedor de pedra Der steinmacher The Supreme Court case that gave the federal government nearly unlimited power El caso de la Corte Suprema que otorgó al gobierno federal un poder casi ilimitado L’affaire de la Cour suprême qui a donné au gouvernement fédéral un pouvoir presque illimité O caso da Suprema Corte que deu ao governo federal poderes quase ilimitados Der Fall des Obersten Gerichtshofs, der der bundesregierung nahezu unbegrenzte macht verlieh The theology of statism La teología del estatismo La théologie de l’étatisme A teologia do estatismo Die theologie des statismus The tragedy of political government La tragedia del gobierno político La tragédie du gouvernement politique A tragédia do governo político Die tragödie der politischen regierung The trouble with bureaucracy El problema con la burocracia Le problème avec la bureaucratie O problema com a burocracia Das problem mit der bürokratie The true history of ethics La verdadera historia de la ética La vraie histoire de l’éthique A verdadeira história da ética Die wahre geschichte der ethik The truth about anarchism La verdad sobre el anarquismo La vérité sur l’anarchisme A verdade sobre o anarquismo Die wahrheit über den anarchismus The unconstitutionality of the Constitution La inconstitucionalidad de la Constitución L’inconstitutionnalité de la Constitution A inconstitucionalidade da Constituição Die verfassungswidrigkeit der Verfassung The unprotected class La clase desprotegida La classe non protégée A classe desprotegida Die ungeschützte klasse The value of money El valor del dinero La valeur de l’argent O valor do dinheiro Der wert des geldes The voluntaryist spirit El espiritu voluntario L’esprit bénévole O espírito voluntário Der freiwillige geist The war prayer La oración de guerra La prière de guerre A oração de guerra Das kriegsgebet The why of homeschool El porqué de la educación en el hogar Le pourquoi de l’école-maison O porquê do homeschool Das warum der homeschool The world’s biggest oxymoron El oxímoron más grande del mundo Le plus grand oxymore du monde O maior oxímoro do mundo Das größte oxymoron der welt There’s no government like no government No hay gobierno como ningún gobierno Il n’y a pas de gouvernement comme aucun gouvernement Não há governo como nenhum governo Es gibt keine regierung wie keine regierung These cages are only for beasts Estas jaulas son solo para bestias Ces cages sont réservées aux bêtes Essas gaiolas são apenas para animais Diese käfige sind nur für bestien This is a government war Esta es una guerra del gobierno Ceci est une guerre gouvernementale Esta é uma guerra do governo Dies ist ein regierungskrieg This is why government should not be involved in health care Es por eso que el gobierno no debe involucrarse en la atención médica C’est pourquoi le gouvernement ne devrait pas être impliqué dans les soins de santé É por isso que o governo não deve se envolver na saúde Aus diesem grund sollte die regierung nicht in die gesundheitsversorgung einbezogen werden Thomas Sowell on politicians Thomas Sowell sobre los políticos Thomas Sowell sur les politiciens Thomas Sowell sobre políticos Thomas Sowell über politiker Thoughts on punishment Pensamientos sobre el castigo Réflexions sur la punition Pensamentos sobre punição Gedanken zur bestrafung Time to divorce marriage and government Hora de divorciarse del matrimonio y el gobierno Il est temps de divorcer du mariage et du gouvernement Hora de se divorciar do casamento e do governo Zeit, sich von ehe und regierung scheiden zu lassen Travel and labour should be peaceful Los viajes y el trabajo deberían ser pacíficos Les voyages et le travail doivent être pacifiques Viagens e trabalho devem ser pacíficos Reisen und arbeit sollten friedlich sein Truth or illusion Verdad o ilusión Vérité ou illusion Verdade ou ilusão Wahrheit oder illusion Understanding religion as child abuse Entendiendo la religión como abuso infantil Comprendre la religion comme un abus envers les enfants Entendendo a religião como abuso infantil Religion als kindesmissbrauch verstehen Utilities Utilidades Utilitaires Utilidades Dienstprogramme Vectoriser Vectoriser Vectoriser Vectoriser Vectoriser Vices are not crimes Los vicios no son crímenes Les vices ne sont pas des crimes Vícios não são crimes Laster sind keine verbrechen Videos Videos Videos Videos Videos Voice Memos Voice Memos Voice Memos Voice Memos Voice Memos Voluntary arrangements are essential to social trust and independence Los arreglos voluntarios son esenciales para la confianza social y la independencia Les arrangements volontaires sont essentiels à la confiance sociale et à l’indépendance Arranjos voluntários são essenciais para a confiança e independência social Freiwillige vereinbarungen sind für soziales vertrauen und unabhängigkeit von wesentlicher bedeutung Vote Nobody Votar Nadie Votez Personne Votar em Ninguém Stimmen sie Niemanden ab War Guerra Guerre Guerra Krieg War is a racket — made by government La guerra es una raqueta — hecha por el gobierno La guerre est une raquette — faite par le gouvernement A guerra é uma raquete — feita pelo governo Krieg ist ein schläger — von der regierung gemacht Weather Weather Weather Weather Weather What are first principles? ¿Qué son los primeros principios? Quels sont les premiers principes? Quais são os primeiros princípios? Was sind erste prinzipien? What are the major debates between anarchists? What are the recurring arguments? ¿Cuáles son los principales debates entre anarquistas? ¿Cuáles son los argumentos recurrentes? Quels sont les débats majeurs entre anarchistes? Quels sont les arguments récurrents? Quais são os principais debates entre anarquistas? Quais são os argumentos recorrentes? Was sind die hauptdebatten zwischen anarchisten? Was sind die wiederkehrenden argumente? What are the myths of socialism? ¿Cuáles son los mitos del socialismo? Quels sont les mythes du socialisme? Quais são os mitos do socialismo? Was sind die mythen des sozialismus? What are the myths of statism? ¿Cuáles son los mitos del estatismo? Quels sont les mythes de l’étatisme? Quais são os mitos do estatismo? Was sind die mythen des statismus? What big government is all about De que se trata el gran gobierno Qu’est-ce que le grand gouvernement? O que é grande governo Worum geht es in der groben regierung? What criticisms have been made of anarchism? ¿Qué críticas se han hecho al anarquismo? Quelles critiques ont été faites à l’anarchisme? Que críticas foram feitas ao anarquismo? Welche kritik wurde am anarchismus geäußert? What determines the value of money? Qué determina el valor del dinero? Qu’est-ce qui détermine la valeur de l’argent? O que determina o valor do dinheiro? Was bestimmt den wert des geldes? What does libertarian mean? ¿Qué significa libertario? Que signifie libertaire? O que significa libertário? Was bedeutet libertär? What has government done to our money ¿Qué ha hecho el gobierno a nuestro dinero? Qu’est-ce que le gouvernement a fait à notre argent O que o governo fez com o nosso dinheiro Was hat die regierung mit unserem geld gemacht? What if charity replaced taxation? Y si la caridad reemplazara los impuestos? Et si la charité remplaçait la fiscalité? E se a caridade substituísse a tributação? Was wäre, wenn die wohltätigkeit die besteuerung ersetzen würde? What is anarchism? What beliefs do anarchists share? ¿Qué es el anarquismo? ¿Qué creencias comparten los anarquistas? Qu’est-ce que l’anarchisme? Quelles croyances les anarchistes partagent-ils? O que é anarquismo? Quais crenças os anarquistas compartilham? Was ist anarchismus? Welche überzeugungen teilen anarchisten? What is anarchism? [01/14] ¿Qué es el anarquismo? [01/14] Qu’est-ce que l’anarchisme? [01/14] O que é anarquismo? [01/14] Was ist anarchismus? [01/14] What is anarchism? [02/14] ¿Qué es el anarquismo? [02/14] Qu’est-ce que l’anarchisme? [02/14] O que é anarquismo? [02/14] Was ist anarchismus? [02/14] What is anarchism? [03/14] ¿Qué es el anarquismo? [03/14] Qu’est-ce que l’anarchisme? [03/14] O que é anarquismo? [03/14] Was ist anarchismus? [03/14] What is anarchism? [04/14] ¿Qué es el anarquismo? [04/14] Qu’est-ce que l’anarchisme? [04/14] O que é anarquismo? [04/14] Was ist anarchismus? [04/14] What is anarchism? [05/14] ¿Qué es el anarquismo? [05/14] Qu’est-ce que l’anarchisme? [05/14] O que é anarquismo? [05/14] Was ist anarchismus? [05/14] What is anarchism? [06/14] ¿Qué es el anarquismo? [06/14] Qu’est-ce que l’anarchisme? [06/14] O que é anarquismo? [06/14] Was ist anarchismus? [06/14] What is anarchism? [07/14] ¿Qué es el anarquismo? [07/14] Qu’est-ce que l’anarchisme? [07/14] O que é anarquismo? [07/14] Was ist anarchismus? [07/14] What is anarcho–capitalism? What is anarcho–communism? What is authoritarian capitalism? What is authoritarian socialism? What is authority? ¿Qué es la autoridad? Qu’est-ce que l’autorité? O que é autoridade? Was ist autorität? What is centrism? ¿Qué es el centrismo? Qu’est-ce que le centrisme? O que é centrismo? Was ist zentrismus? What is communism? What is conservatism? What is corporatism? What is democratic socialism? What is exploitation? ¿Qué es la explotación? Qu’est-ce que l’exploitation? O que é exploração? Was ist ausbeutung? What is fascism? What is Georgism? What is international socialism? What is liberalism? What is libertarian capitalism? What is libertarian socialism? What is Marxism? What is minarchism? What is mutualism? What is national socialism? What is neo–conservatism? What is neo–liberalism? What is progressivism? What is property? ¿Qué es la propiedad? Qu’est-ce que la propriété? O que é propriedade? Was ist eigentum? What is social democracy? What is socialism? What is syndicalism? What is the free market? ¿Qué es el mercado libre? Qu'est-ce que le marché libre? O que é o mercado livre? Was ist der freie markt? What is the proper way to study man? ¿Cuál es la forma correcta de estudiar al hombre? Quelle est la bonne façon d’étudier l’homme? Qual é a maneira correta de estudar o homem? Was ist der richtige weg, um den menschen zu studieren? What justifications are there for anarcho-capitalism? ¿Qué justificaciones hay para el anarcocapitalismo? Quelles justifications y a-t-il pour l’anarcho-capitalisme? Quais são as justificativas para o anarco-capitalismo? Welche rechtfertigungen gibt es für den anarcho-kapitalismus? What major subdivisions may be made among anarchists? ¿Qué subdivisiones importantes se pueden realizar entre los anarquistas? Quelles subdivisions majeures peuvent être faites parmi les anarchistes? Quais subdivisões principais podem ser feitas entre os anarquistas? Welche hauptunterteilungen können unter anarchisten vorgenommen werden? What moral justifications have been offered for anarchism? ¿Qué justificaciones morales se han ofrecido al anarquismo? Quelles justifications morales ont été proposées pour l’anarchisme? Que justificativas morais foram oferecidas para o anarquismo? Welche moralischen rechtfertigungen wurden für den anarchismus angeboten? What other anarchist viewpoint are there? ¿Qué otro punto de vista anarquista hay? Quel autre point de vue anarchiste existe-t-il? Que outro ponto de vista anarquista existe? Welchen anderen anarchistischen standpunkt gibt es? What seventeenth century England’s state church had in common with today’s school systems Lo que la iglesia estatal de Inglaterra del siglo XVII tenía en común con los sistemas escolares actuales Ce que l’Église d’État britannique du XVIIe siècle avait en commun avec les systèmes scolaires actuels O que a igreja estatal da Inglaterra do século XVII tinha em comum com os sistemas escolares de hoje Was die englische staatskirche im 17 jahrhundert mit den heutigen schulsystemen gemeinsam hatte When is government a legitimate authority? ¿Cuándo es el gobierno una autoridad legítima? Quand le gouvernement est-il une autorité légitime? Quando o governo é uma autoridade legítima? Wann ist die regierung eine legitime autorität? Who are the major anarchist thinkers? ¿Quiénes son los principales pensadores anarquistas? Qui sont les principaux penseurs anarchistes? Quem são os principais pensadores anarquistas? Wer sind die wichtigsten anarchistischen denker? Who’s really being naive? ¿Quién es realmente ingenuo? Qui est vraiment naïf? Quem está realmente sendo ingênuo? Wer ist wirklich naiv? Who’s the Scrooge? Libertarians and compassion ¿Quién es el Scrooge? Libertarios y compasión Qui est le Scrooge? Libertariens et compassion Quem é o Scrooge? Libertários e compaixão Wer ist der Scrooge? Libertäre und mitgefühl Why should one consider anarchism in the first place? ¿Por qué debería uno considerar el anarquismo en primer lugar? Pourquoi devrait-on envisager l’anarchisme en premier lieu? Por que alguém deveria considerar o anarquismo em primeiro lugar? Warum sollte man überhaupt über anarchismus nachdenken? Why should one consider anarcho-capitalism? ¿Por qué debería uno considerar el anarcocapitalismo? Pourquoi envisager l’anarcho-capitalisme? Por que se deve considerar o anarco-capitalismo? Warum sollte man den anarchokapitalismus in betracht ziehen? Why socialism causes pollution Por qué el socialismo causa contaminación Pourquoi le socialisme cause la pollution Por que o socialismo causa poluição Warum sozialismus umweltverschmutzung verursacht Why this spek? ¿Por qué este spek? Pourquoi ce spek? Por que esse spek? Warum diese spek? Why war? Por qué la guerra? Pourquoi la guerre? Por que guerra? Warum krieg? Without firing a single shot Sin disparar un solo tiro Sans tirer un seul coup Sem disparar um único tiro Ohne einen einzigen schuss abzugeben You don’t own me No me tienes Tu ne m'appartiens pas Você não é meu dono Du besitzt mich nicht You don’t own other people No eres dueño de otras personas Vous ne possédez pas d’autres personnes Você não possui outras pessoas Sie besitzen keine anderen personen “Taxes are the price we pay to live in a civilised society” — or are they? “Los impuestos son el precio que pagamos por vivir en una sociedad civilizada” — o no? ”Les impôts sont le prix à payer pour vivre dans une société civilisée“ — ou le sont-ils? “Os impostos são o preço que pagamos para viver em uma sociedade civilizada” — ou não? ”Steuern sind der preis, den wir zahlen, um in einer zivilisierten gesellschaft zu leben“ — oder doch?